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PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RULES
HENRY E. SMITH*
This Article builds on the literature generated by Calabresi and Melamed’s frame-
work for protecting entitlements through property and liability rules.  Pointing to
the gap between academic commentators’ conclusions that liability rules are supe-
rior in most circumstances and the reality that property rules overwhelmingly
predominate in the law, Professor Smith offers a theory of the advantages of prop-
erty rules that is based on information costs.  The starting point for this theory is the
observation that assets are heterogeneous in ways that are economically significant
but costly to identify and value; liability rules inevitably involve some need for an
official to make such valuations.  Professor Smith argues that the preference for
liability rules rests on certain convenient but overly simple assumptions that elide
the costs of producing information about assets and activities.
Second, Professor Smith explores the natural pairing between property rules and
owners’ rights to exclude others from their property.  The “exclusion strategy” for
protecting property rights relies on simple on/off signals such as the boundary
around a parcel of land to communicate rights and duties to the rest of the world.
Within this protected zone, owners have open-ended choices of how to invest in or
consume the asset.  This Article shows how pairing property rules with an exclusion
strategy has advantages that stem from saving information costs, deterring opportu-
nism by potential takers, and discouraging owners from engaging in wasteful self-
help.
Finally, this Article shows how the information-cost theory illuminates the connec-
tion between property rule protection and traditional notions such as residual
claimancy and property in the sense of an in rem right to a thing.
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I
INTRODUCTION
How entitlements should be protected has preoccupied scholars
in law and economics for over thirty years, but the gap between theory
and reality is large and growing.  Most theorists have built on the
framework of liability rules and property rules proposed by Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their landmark article over
thirty years ago.1  In the domain of transferable entitlements, they
provided a framework for understanding the variety of remedies for
protecting entitlements by distinguishing property rules from liability
rules.  They noticed that some remedies are set at such a high level
that they would in theory deter all takings of entitlements without the
owner’s consent.  Such “property rules” would include injunctions and
supracompensatory damages that would make a nonconsensual taking
of an entitlement less attractive than bargaining to a consensual price
with the present owner.  By contrast, liability rules rely on officially
determined non-market “prices,” and allow others to take the owner’s
entitlement as long as these officially determined damages are paid.
The level of the damages is set to compensate the owner, but leaves
room for nonconsensual takings by actors who value the entitlement
more than the current owner.
Contrasting these two types of remedies leads to some very basic
questions.  Does the law follow any economic logic in its use of com-
pensatory damages in some contexts and injunctions or punitive dam-
ages in others?  What does economic analysis tell us about the
1 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  Calabresi and
Melamed also identified and discussed inalienability rules, but, like much of the literature,
this Article will focus on property rules and liability rules as alternatives for entitlements
that are transferable in principle.
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desirability of the one versus the other?  Although Calabresi and
Melamed stressed that the appropriate form of protection would
depend on numerous considerations of efficiency and justice, they
offered a generalization that property rules are preferable in situa-
tions of low transaction costs, and liability rules should be used where
transactions costs—exchange costs, holding out, and free riding—are
so high as to preclude a wealth-increasing transfer of an entitlement.2
Since the publication of Calabresi and Melamed’s article, the conven-
tional wisdom among law-and-economics scholars had long been that
property rules are superior when transaction costs are low.3  But such
scholars also noted with approval the tendency towards giving dam-
ages in the case of nuisances with widespread effects like pollution.4
This initially favorable but limited view of liability rules has gathered
steam, and over the years most commentators theorizing about enti-
tlement protection have come to conclude that liability rules are gen-
erally preferable to property rules in achieving an efficient allocation
of resources.5  Property rules find relatively few defenders among
2 Id. at 1106–08, 1127 (arguing that liability rules are preferable in situations of high
transaction costs and that property rules are preferable in situations of low transaction
costs); id. at 1110 (discussing efficiency and distributional goals in choice between property
rules and liability rules); id. at 1093–1105 (discussing considerations of economic efficiency,
distributional goals, and other justice reasons).
3 Id. at 1106–10; see also, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 104–06 (4th ed. 2004) (suggesting refinement of traditional argument); Ian Ayres
& Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules, 32 J.
LEGAL STUD. 121, 123–24 (2003) (noting conventional wisdom and summarizing criticism);
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revis-
ited:  Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219, 219–21 (2001)
(discussing traditional view and citing literature).
4 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1105–06, 1115–24 (arguing for liability rules R
in pollution context).  The leading cases for this literature are Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), and Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development
Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).  For a discussion of the positive reaction to Boomer and
Spur, and for an argument that this praise is overstated and that the presumption in favor
of injunctions should be stronger than the current consensus suggests, see Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1037–45 (2004).
5 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:  Dividing a Legal Entitle-
ment to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036–72 (1995) (arguing that liability
rules facilitate bargaining); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Lia-
bility Rules:  An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (arguing that liability
rules are superior to property rules even when courts are uncertain about magnitude of
harm, and concluding that there should be prima facie case favoring liability rules for con-
trolling harmful externalities, but noting there is strong theoretical case for property rule
protection of possessory rights in things); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Exter-
nalities and Protecting Entitlements:  Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy
Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42–48 (1979) (comparing property rules, liability rules,
and tax subsidies, and using proposed framework to rank approaches under various condi-
tions).  The literature advocating a liability rules solution in particular contexts includes a
wide range of situations in which holding out and other strategic behavior are thought to
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legal economists, which is all the more surprising since property rules
abound in the law.6  If anything, the law treats property rule protec-
tion as the norm and liability rule protection as the exception—the
opposite of what the bulk of recent economic commentary would lead
one to expect.
In this Article, I will argue that the preference for liability rules
rests on certain overly simple assumptions about how assets and activ-
ities are individuated and evaluated.  Recent commentary has argued
that one of liability rules’ chief advantages is that they economize on
the information that officials need in order to ensure efficient alloca-
tion.  Liability rules achieve this happy state of affairs because they
“harness” the information that private parties have about the value of
assets and activities.7  As a result, liability rules are sometimes said to
be superior even where transaction costs are low enough that the par-
ties could bargain consensually.8  These arguments are all the more
be severe. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 452 & n.44 (1995) (describing
survey of legal literature from 1975 to 1986, in which some dozen proposals for liability
rules in high-transaction-costs settings were proposed, and giving examples).  More
recently, liability rule proponents have explored rules that decouple the functions of
choosing who will have the entitlement and who is compensated; liability rules advocated
include put-style rules as well as traditional call-style rules.  RONEN AVRAHAM, MODULAR
LIABILITY RULES 6–7 (John M. Olin Center for Law & Econ., Paper No. 01-003, 2001),
available at http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm; Ian Ayres &
Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1, 51–54 (2001); Krier & Schwab, supra, at 471 (proposing rule under which
A can stop activity and require B to disgorge damages that B will now not have to suffer);
see also Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854–56
(1993) (developing possibility of put-style rules).
6 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral:  The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093–96 (1997) (arguing that undercompensation con-
cerns usually outweigh hold-out problems, making property rules dominant); Carol M.
Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2194–97 (analyzing liability
under average harm rule as common-pool problem in some circumstances); Henry E.
Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647,
683–96, 706 (2000) (showing that quality changes can make property rules superior).  Some
authors argue that high administrative costs, and valuation costs in particular, may cause
property rules to be superior to liability rules in some contexts. See, e.g., Richard R.W.
Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules:  Broken
Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 289–90 (2003) (arguing that comparative
evaluation required under property rule can be easier than absolute valuation under lia-
bility rule); Krier & Schwab, supra note 5, at 459–64 (arguing for property rules when R
administrative costs are high); Smith, supra, at 685–86 (suggesting variable measurement
costs may favor property rules). But see, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 729, R
750–51 (arguing that information about average harm can be developed at low cost and
that information required for property rules is costly).
7 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 725. R
8 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 5, at 1036–72 (arguing that liability rules facilitate R
bargaining).
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striking because they run counter to the intuition that liability rules
are more demanding on officials and less respectful of individual
valuations.
The new wisdom in favor of liability rules also runs counter to
strong tendencies in the law.  Property rules are prevalent in the law
and are by no means exceptional.  Basic actions like trespass protect
entitlements by means of injunctions and punitive damages in the civil
law and penalties in the criminal law.  If A owns Blackacre and B
enters without A’s consent, A can get an injunction against B and can
seek both compensatory and punitive damages. B might even be
liable for criminal trespass.  It will not help B to claim that the actual
damage to A was small or even that he tried bargaining with A but
that A refused all reasonable offers.9  Further, when liability rules are
used, as in eminent domain or in the law of necessity, they are often
hedged about with conditions and restrictions that are hard to justify if
liability rules are to be preferred as a general matter.10
This gap between theory and law leaves two main choices.  One
possibility is that the law needs a major overhaul to make it conform
more closely to the normative conclusions in favor of liability rules in
the literature.  Alternatively, one could bring theory and law closer
together by seeking an account of why property rules are often prefer-
able to liability rules, despite the many benefits of liability rules iden-
tified by commentators.  A theory of the advantages of property rules
might also allow an explanation of why property rules tend to be asso-
ciated with entitlements that we label “property.”  Taking this latter
approach, this Article will offer a defense of property rules that avoids
the difficulties raised in the pro–liability rule literature.  The account
of property rules offered here will rest on the costs of producing infor-
mation about assets and activities.  Information production includes
delineating and evaluating assets and activities, and is sometimes
called “measurement” in the economic literature.11  As we will see,
the information thus obtained may be of a very approximate sort
(making the term “measurement” sound overly exact), because the
production of information consumes resources—it is costly.
9 For a dramatic example, see Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis.
1997), in which the court upheld a verdict of punitive damages of $100,000 on nominal
compensatory damages.  Even though the plaintiffs, motivated at least in part by the mis-
taken belief that prescription might result, had refused all offers to bargain, the defendants
had moved a trailer home across the plaintiffs’ land.
10 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 2092–94, 2106, 2111, 2120; see also infra Part II.A. R
11 This use of the word “measurement” is characteristic of the work of Yoram Barzel,
who points out that measurement is the operationalization of information. See Yoram
Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27, 28 & n.3
(1982).
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The preference for property rules can be understood as a
response to the information costs that shape other aspects of entitle-
ment delineation.  First, in what I will call the argument from “delega-
tion,” I will show that property rules are naturally paired with the
rights to exclude that are typical of property law.  Property rules ben-
efit from the savings in information costs that are made possible by
rights to exclude as opposed to more tailored use rights.12  Second,
and consistent with the information-cost point, exclusion and property
rules will allow less room for opportunism on the part of potential
takers of entitlements.  Third, on the owner’s side, exclusion and prop-
erty rules obviate the need to expend resources on wasteful self-help.
I will show that property rules are more closely bound up with the
traditional notion of property in the sense of an in rem right to a thing
once the information-cost advantages of classic property-law methods
of delineating rights are properly understood.
All three of these arguments can be seen as consequences of the
costliness of acquiring and acting on information.  The problem of
information in protecting property is characterized not just by risk but
also by varying degrees of uncertainty.  First-order production of
information on the relevant asset or class of assets involves not only
managing risk, but also turning uncertainty into more manageable
risk.  According to Frank Knight’s classic distinction, risk is variability
in outcomes that can be captured by a probability distribution, but
uncertainty cannot be quantified in this way.13  Consider risk first.  If
an asset might be worth $100 in situation type 1 but only $40 in situa-
tion type 2, and if situation type 1 will occur with 75% probability and
situation type 2 with 25% probability, then the asset’s expected value
is the sum of the values discounted by their probabilities, i.e., $85 =
(.75 × $100) + (.25 × $40).  The asset is risky but there is no uncer-
tainty:  All the possible states, their probabilities, and their pay-off
values are known.  Uncertainty involves the lack of such knowledge.
If in this example one did not know the values in the states, did not
know the probabilities, or, most radically, did not know the set of pos-
sible future states of the world, the problem would be one of uncer-
tainty rather than risk.  In the real world, there is a spectrum running
from uncertainty to risk depending on the degree of ignorance of
probabilities and states (and, for this reason, most of the argument I
will make could be recast in terms of greater and lesser amounts of
12 I will call this the “exclusion” strategy for delineating rights. See infra Part III.A.
13 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–21, 197–232 (1921).
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“risk”).14  Turning uncertainty into risk is a matter of gathering the
information that would allow events to be grouped into classes over
which ever-more-accurate actuarial statements can be made.  This
process occurs most obviously in insurance, but Knight argued that it
is pervasive in economic life.  As Knight recognized, entrepreneurs in
particular profit from opportunities afforded by uncertainty.15  In a
world where people share identical information about risk, the entre-
preneur’s opportunity to profit from discovering new opportunities
would vanish.  People differ in their ability to make sense of situa-
tions, and the same situation might be closer to the risk end of the
spectrum for some, especially entrepreneurs, while it is characterized
by uncertainty for others.
Much of recent economics, including the literature on liability
rules, explicitly or implicitly reduces all uncertainty, in Knight’s sense,
to risk as a (very simple and convenient) theoretical assumption.  This
simplification can be accomplished in several ways, but I will argue
that all of them miss a major part of the picture.  One method is
simply to assume that all knowledge problems involve a known state
space and subjective knowledge about probabilities and values.16
When we act on the best such knowledge, we are doing the best we
can and there is no point in considering what we do not know.  This is
easiest when commentators assume that a special sort of dichotomy
holds:  Either an actor (a judge, for example) has perfect average
actuarial knowledge of the class that an event falls into, or one has full
knowledge of the particulars of the event itself.17  For example, it is
assumed that a polluter knows the distribution of victim harm or at
least the average harm of the “type” of victim—in Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell’s formulation, the polluter knows “the average harm
for cases characterized by the facts the court observes.”18  A second
14 Although much of Knight’s discussion is couched in terms of a clear distinction
between risk and uncertainty, he eventually comes to the conclusion that situations vary by
degree along a continuum from pure risk to pure uncertainty. Id. at 199.
15 Id. at 264–90; see also, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST
PROCESS 40–67 (1985).
16 See Leonard J. Savage, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 69–104 (2d rev. ed. 1972)
(expounding subjective expected-utility approach).
17 A particularly explicit example of these assumptions is Louis Kaplow, The Value of
Accuracy in Adjudication:  An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 312–13 (1994).
As Dan Ortiz points out in his response to Kaplow’s article, this kind of actuarial informa-
tion is not easy to come by and, as in insurance problems, leaves room for moral hazard
and adverse selection.  Daniel R. Ortiz, Neoactuarialism:  Comment on Kaplow (1), 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 403, 403–06 (1994).  Ortiz’s insight that the average-harm approach poses the
problems of actuarialism in Kaplow’s approach to accuracy in adjudication dovetails with
the uncertainty argument for property rules I present in Part III infra.
18 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 719. R
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method is to assume that whatever we do not know will be no more
likely to bias outcomes in one direction than another, so that treating
unknown probabilities as equal does not lead us to do any worse than
if we worried explicitly about uncertainty.  This “principle of insuffi-
cient reason” or “equal assignment rule” allows uncertainty to be
treated as if it were risk.19
If, as commentators routinely assume, pure risk were all that is
involved, many problems disappear.  As long as a court can achieve an
unbiased estimate of average value or some more sophisticated
variant, then over the long run more pervasive employment of liability
rules will improve allocation in the sense that more transfers to
higher-valuing users will occur.20  The problem is that uncertainty
does not allow for this thinking in terms of averages because we do
not know what is supposed to be averaged.  The equal-assignment rule
presupposes risk as opposed to uncertainty.  There are methods for
turning uncertainty into risk, by aggregating instances such that
numerical trends in likelihoods emerge.  But this collection of infor-
mation is not costless; owners, takers, and officials have different abili-
ties to define the appropriate classes for evaluating average harm.  In
particular, damages based on average harm presuppose that officials
are able to cost-effectively aggregate instances into actuarially sen-
sible classes.  As I will argue, this will often not be the case.  The gen-
eral question is who is in the position to best deal with uncertainty:
owners and markets on the one hand, or juries, judges, and other offi-
cials on the other.
19 See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, NOTES ON THE THEORY OF CHOICE 146 (1988)
(explaining that “the principle of insufficient reason . . . says that if I have no reason to
suspect that one outcome is more likely than another, then by reason of symmetry the
outcomes are equally likely, and equally likely probabilities may be ascribed to them”); R.
DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS:  INTRODUCTION AND CRIT-
ICAL SURVEY 284–86 (1957) (discussing principle of insufficient reason); STEPHEN M.
STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS:  THE MEASUREMENT OF UNCERTAINTY BEFORE
1900, at 111–12, 117, 127–29 (1986) (discussing history of principle of insufficient reason);
Craig K. Ihara, Maximin and Other Decision Principles, 12 PHIL. TOPICS 59, 63 (1981)
(“The ‘principle of insufficient reason,’ otherwise known as the Bayles, or LaPlace crite-
rion, states that if we have absolutely no information about the relative probabilities we
must assign equal probabilities to alternatives and then adopt the course of action whose
expected utility is the highest.” (citation omitted)).  Not surprisingly, Knight explicitly
questions the value of this assumption. KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 222. R
20 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 719 (discussing average value).  More sophis- R
ticated variants include measures such as common value plus average idiosyncratic value,
or mean expected victim value conditional on taker’s actual value at the point where this
conditional mean equals taker’s actual value.  Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 3, at 135–36 R
(setting forth latter, fixed point, result); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 762 n.157, R
789–90 (mentioning but not pursuing possibilities of damages rules other than average
damages, such as setting damages at highest possible common value plus owners’ mean
idiosyncratic value).
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These assumptions for treating uncertainty as risk are sometimes
very useful, but I will argue that they are very unhelpful when it
comes to explaining property rules and liability rules.  Property itself
is a response to uncertainty, and property rules derive some advantage
as a response to uncertainty.  In this Article, I will present three
related arguments based on information costs for the superiority of
property rules.  All three information-cost arguments for property
rules can be seen as effects of uncertainty.
First, exclusion, property, and property rules fit together.
Resources in the world are multidimensional and not homogeneous
from one token to the next.  But producing information about the
things in the world is costly and thus things tend to be grouped by
type, even though the tokens in those types are not equally suited to
various uses.  An asset like a plot of land is easily seen to involve
many attributes (soil nutrients, water, mineral deposits, surface sup-
port, etc.) and the presence and proportions of such attributes vary
from one specimen to the next.  If delineation and evaluation—the
production of information—were costless, then the response to the
problem of heterogeneous tokens would be to measure the valued
attributes of the tokens—at zero cost—and set up new, more fine-
grained types.  This process would continue until marginal benefit
declined to zero.  At this point, the homogeneity of assets and services
would be reestablished, with smaller groupings of assets and services
under one price.  Bins of oranges will be smaller, or oranges might be
individually priced, the way original works of art are.  Human minds,
however, cannot know or process every detail of the environment; the
mind segments the environment into things and things into classes
based on similarities.21  Thus, in many cases, significant differences
exist among the seemingly interchangeable assets and services, from
the oranges in a grocer’s bin to toasters to haircuts, that are grouped
under the same type.  These differences are economically significant
because the attributes are valued; the different levels of these attrib-
utes in the tokens cause the various tokens to differ in value.22  How
21 See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 205–06 (1921) (noting that finite intelligence R
requires classification and fundamental role that it has played in thought and theory of
thought); 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 15–16 (John
W. Yolton ed., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. rev. ed. 1964) (1689) (arguing that only particulars
exist, but that having idea and word for every particular is beyond human capacity and
would be useless even if it were possible); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 437 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969) (1840) (discussing “general
ideas,” which group together particulars because of inadequate ability of human intelli-
gence to hold all particulars in mind simultaneously).
22 For example, the oranges in a grocer’s bin may all be priced the same by the piece or
by weight, but may differ in terms of texture, color, and other features that correlate with
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far to measure the attributes of any given asset and what it is best used
for at any given time are subject to risk and uncertainty, and different
actors will have differing abilities to develop and act on this
information.
Property responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses
together and delegating to the owner the choice of how to use the
asset, thus avoiding the need to specify uses at any stage.  I will argue
that property rules have advantages that stem from this delegation to
the owner of the tasks of gathering and acting on information about
assets.  Property gives the right to exclude from a “thing,” good
against everyone else.  On the dutyholder side, the message is a simple
one—to “keep out.”  In this way, the right to exclude simultaneously
protects a reservoir of uses to the owner without officials needing to
know what those might be.23  This is what I have called elsewhere an
“exclusion” strategy, in which very rough signals—like presence inside
or outside a boundary line around a parcel of land—are used to pro-
tect an indefinite class of uses with minimal precision.24  By contrast,
what I call a “governance” strategy is one in which the internalization
problem is solved on something close to a use-by-use basis; rights are
delineated using signals (sometimes called “proxy variables” or
“proxies” in the economic literature) that pick out and protect indi-
vidual uses and user behavior.  (Between these two extremes are strat-
egies of a mixed sort that bunch uses together under variables of
intermediate precision.)  In this paper, I will argue that property rules
have an advantage in implementing the exclusion strategy so that,
where an exclusion strategy is called for, property rules will generally
be superior to liability rules.
juiciness and taste, the attributes that consumers value most.  Barzel, supra note 11, at R
28–32.  Where every orange in a heterogeneous group is priced the same, people will
search among the oranges using “proxy measures” or signals like texture and color to
choose those oranges with more of the valued attributes—in this case juiciness and taste—
per dollar of price than the average orange.  Because the signal is imperfect, such search
effort allows a consumer to take advantage of inaccuracy in pricing.  The unpriced excess
of valued attributes will invite consumers to expend costly effort at differentiating and
evaluating the oranges.  Barzel also examines the role of suppression of information, repu-
tation, warranties, and other devices in reducing these costs. See id. at 32–39.
23 Many theorists have noted the tight connection between the right to exclude and
property. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.  Building on the work of Steven R
Cheung, Carol Rose develops a typology of pollution controls and uses the term “keep
out” as a shorthand for simple rules of exclusion.  Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a
Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970); Carol
M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:  Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–36.
24 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Prop-
erty Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454–56, S467–78 (2002).
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Second, the advantages of delegation to the owner through exclu-
sion avoid certain problems of opportunism that liability rules invite.
Property rules can be superior to liability rules where this delegation
is to someone—the “owner”—who has an advantage in dealing with
uncertainty but cannot credibly communicate her information about
the uncertainty.  The problem with regarding everything as risk rather
than uncertainty is that it suppresses the question of the nature of
information and people’s differential ability to discover and act on it.
Owners are often in the position of the Knightian entrepreneur:
Ownership concentrates on the owner the benefits of information
developed about—and bets placed on—the value of the asset.  Like
Knightian entrepreneurs, such owners make bets in situations of
uncertainty and are rewarded or punished depending on how those
bets turn out later when the uncertainty is resolved.  The owner
develops information about the attributes and potential uses of the
asset he owns, but he may not be able to communicate his prediction
about future values to others at reasonable cost.
Thus, if someone believes that a rock formation on Blackacre will
be a tourist site twenty years from now, one can buy Blackacre,
become its Owner, and wait.  If, in the meantime, someone (Taker)
takes Blackacre and only has to pay damages, Owner will either have
to convince a court that the rock formation is going to be valuable or
will have to bribe Taker.  Under some quite ordinary conditions, this
situation will lead to social loss.  Convincing a court will sometimes be
infeasible (or not cost-effective) because it is not likely that a court
can process the information about the rock formation better than
potential trading partners of the owner.25  The court has to be skep-
tical of the statements of both Owner and Taker.  Owners have every
incentive to inflate their values, and the bets any given owner has
placed may fail; the point of property is that failure as well as success
will be brought home to Owner.  As for bribing Taker, the more that
Owner has to share the gain from discovering the information, the less
incentive there will be to develop it.  While it is true that we could give
extra damages to reflect the creation of the information or could use
fancier liability rules proposed more recently,26 we are then back with
25 Whether the benefits of conveying information credibly to a third party exceed the
costs of doing so is called “verifiability” in the contract literature and is a matter of degree,
although in contract theory it is often convenient to assume that conveying credible infor-
mation is either costless or infinitely costly. See, e.g., BERNARD SALANIE´, THE ECONOMICS
OF CONTRACTS:  A PRIMER 175–89 (1997); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the
Courts:  An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
271, 279–80 (1992).
26 See infra notes 30, 102–10 and accompanying text. R
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the valuation problems facing a court.  People will expend resources
to exploit the arbitrage opportunity resulting from individual mispric-
ings under a liability rule, leading to a deadweight loss.27  More gener-
ally, it may be cheaper to protect the owner’s bet on Blackacre and let
the market value the information twenty years from now than to have
officials try to settle up right now as between the owner and someone
engaging in a nonconsensual taking.
Third, exclusion-style rights and property rules have advantages
in situations where high-valuing owners can protect themselves
outside the legal system.  When these owners opt out in this way, they
incur costs (for secrecy agreements, additional fences, alarm systems)
in order to prevent takings that would be undercompensated under an
average-harm liability rule.  This opting out leads to an overall social
loss if these additional costs of self-help under the liability rule cause
the costs of the liability rule system to exceed those of the corre-
sponding property rule system.  This problem is aggravated where
both potential takers and potential victim-owners can engage in an
arms race of measures to maximize their value under the liability rule
regime.  In some respects, this problem bears a relationship to the
much-debated question of why theft is considered inefficient.28  As in
the case of theft, the losses from allowing compensated takings
include the costs of certain high-valuing owners opting out of the
system through self-help measures and certain takers investing in
opportunistic takings.  Some pro–liability rule commentators see this
as a problem limited to the case of the taking of “things.”29  But the
purest pro–liability rule position reestablishes the puzzle of why prop-
erty rules are needed to prevent wasteful self-help:  “Dual-chooser
rules,” under which both parties have a say on how the entitlement is
allocated, and “higher-order liability rules,” which implement
ascending damages for successive takings, can lead to single-price and
ascending-price auctions, respectively, that harness private informa-
tion and put the asset in the hands of the party that values it most.30
But viewing assets as heterogenous multi-attribute collections that are
27 In this case, exploitation of the arbitrage opportunity does not lead to more accurate
prices.  Rather, actors can be expected to expend resources to effect a pure transfer.
28 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 769 & n.178. R
29 See id. at 768–69.
30 Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions:  Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 711 (1996) (noting that higher-order liability rules
with ascending damages on successive takings create auctions); see also AVRAHAM, supra
note 5 (proposing liability rules in which parties are allocated pairs of options); Ayres & R
Goldbart, supra note 5, at 51–61 (discussing higher-order rules and showing how allowing R
for multiple prices can never do worse than other rules, but alluding to practical problems
with implementation).
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costly to classify will in turn help explain why property rules solve the
problem of wasteful self-help in a way that even sophisticated liability
rule approaches cannot.
The advantages of exclusion and property rules become clearer
when the full costs of the liability rules approach and the (post-)realist
picture of property are taken into account.31  The liability rule
approach perpetuates law and economics’ heavy reliance on the
classic realist bundle-of-sticks approach to property.  The context-spe-
cific tailoring of the sticks in the bundle is extended to the question of
the scope and strength of entitlement protection through ever-fancier
forms of liability rules (as opposed to the traditional layperson’s view
that property is a right to a thing).32  In the liability rule literature, as
in Coase’s article on social cost, liability rules and property rules are
compared as to how well they can choose allocation of a resource
between two people who have announced incompatible uses.33
Part II will set up the problem of the production of information
of assets, and Part III will develop a theory of how property rules
handle these problems of information production and uncertainty.
Part IV will show how the property rule versus liability rule contro-
versy fits into the larger picture of the nature of property.  Property
rules and exclusion turn out to be closely related to the likelihood that
an entitlement will be treated as property.  The information-cost ratio-
nale for exclusion and property rules offered in this Article also helps
explain and justify the absence of “put-style” liability rules that
operate as forced sales of entitlements.  And exclusion and property
rules turn out to be very important in a central problem of property
and organization alike, the delineation of residual claims.  Part V
concludes.
II
THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF PROPERTY RULES
Property rules present a puzzle.  The commentary building on the
property rule/liability rule framework has uncovered what appear to
31 The successors to various aspects of legal realism include such disparate movements
as law and economics and critical legal studies, but when it comes to the bundle-of-rights
picture of property most would say “we are all realists now.”
32 For a discussion of how law and economics has adopted the realist approach to prop-
erty as a bundle of sticks, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
33 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–28 (1960).  For a
discussion of how Coase presupposes that property can be treated as the list of use-rights
that emerges from decisions of the type A versus B and how this approach is carried for-
ward in the literature on property rules and liability rules, see Merrill & Smith, supra note
32, at 369–71, 379–83. R
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be overwhelming advantages for liability rules.  This Part first sketches
the prevalence in the law of property rules and surveys some of the
long-standing justifications for property itself and some isolated
recent pro–property rule commentary that draws on these traditional
ideas.  Next, I turn to the burgeoning pro–liability rule literature,
which makes the heavy reliance on property rules in the law all the
more puzzling.  I then bring out some common informational assump-
tions upon which the pro–liability rule position rests.  Third and
finally, in order to set the stage for my information-cost theory of
property rules, I break the choice between property rules and liability
rules into three constituent problems.  Property rules and liability
rules reflect a choice of strength of remedy, the shape of the liability
function, and the unit of concern.  Later we will see how the resolu-
tion of these questions in property rules—a strong remedy that kicks
in when rights to things are violated—solves a basic and widespread
information-cost problem.
A. The Traditional Preference for Property Rules
The arguments for liability rules challenge a long tradition of
preference for property rules in the law and a line of traditional com-
mentary that still resonates today.  The traditional justifications for
property point to property rule protection.  Recently the pro–liability
rule literature has challenged these positions by arguing that liability
rules would be superior to property rules even in securing the tradi-
tionally cited benefits of property.  Later I will show how the informa-
tion-cost theory recasts and strengthens the traditional case for
property rules.
Property rules abound in the law.  In the law of real property,
trespassers face injunctions and often punitive damages as well.34
There is even a criminal law of trespass.  Theft of personal property is
a criminal offense, and on the civil side plaintiffs are given a choice of
recovering the thing in replevin or damages (a forced sale) in trover.35
Even in contracts, the area of law in which liability rules are thought
to be most common, specific performance is arguably routine, despite
the black-letter rule conditioning the availability of injunctions on
34 See, e.g., Warren v. Parkhurst, 78 N.E. 579, 583 (N.Y. 1906) (upholding injunction
against polluters of stream); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997)
(upholding award of punitive damages where only nominal compensatory damages were
found).
35 See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.3, at
8–9 (3d ed. 2000).
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“irreparable injury” and the inadequacy of damages.36  In general,
injunctions are widely available.37
The literature has identified the main types of situations in which
current law relies on liability rules, and I will do no more than briefly
summarize these.  The two major classes of situations are those char-
acterized by very high transaction costs and by hold-out and other
strategic behavior.
Consider first the use of liability rules in situations of high trans-
action costs.  In accidents, there is no feasible opportunity for the
future defendant to locate and bargain with the future plaintiff—
transaction costs would be prohibitive.38  The use of a property rule
might call forth excessive precautions; behind a veil of ignorance—for
example, as to whether one would be a driver or a pedestrian—one
might well choose, even for cases of negligence, a liability rule of some
sort as a substitute for the ex ante transaction that cannot occur.  The
only alternative for such past harms would be a property rule imple-
mented as extra damages or criminal sanctions;39 if an accident has
crushed the plaintiff’s hand, courts usually cannot order it restored.
Intentional torts are another matter; the suspicion here is that there is
more going on than a missed transaction.  Where torts are intentional,
property rules, in the form of punitive damages, come back into the
picture.40
The second major category of liability rules consists of those that
counteract potential problems of hold-out behavior and strategic bar-
gaining.  Calabresi and Melamed themselves realized that hold-out
behavior was a major motivation for liability rules.41  Because
someone can take the entitlement from its present holder and pay
official damages, the present entitlement holder cannot hold out for
more than that amount; no one would pay more in a consensual trans-
36 Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687,
695 (1990) (noting rule’s evolution into simple balancing test with de facto preference for
remedy preferred by plaintiff).
37 See id. at 701–22 (citing numerous decisions granting injunctions).
38 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1108–09. R
39 See id. at 1124–26.
40 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 2099–2100.  In the liability rule literature it is R
common to identify punitive damages as implementing a property rule, because punitive
damages aim at deterring rather than pricing nonconsensual transfers. See, e.g., Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 1, at 1126 & n.71 (arguing that property rules backed up by crim- R
inal sanctions and punitive damages are used to prevent thieves and intentional tortfeasors
from being able to convert property rules into liability rules); Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 5, at 724 (noting that “a liability rule with very high damages is equivalent to property R
rule protection of victims”).
41 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1106–07. R
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action than she could pay in a nonconsensual transaction.42  In the
classic nuisance dispute, many commentators worry that the numer-
osity of the victims will lead to high costs of exchanging an entitlement
to be free from pollution and will call forth undesirable hold-out
behavior.43  If so, then it would make sense to replace traditional
injunctive relief with damages, an approach adopted in the case of
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.44
The prototypical example of liability rules comes from eminent
domain.  Eminent domain is at its least controversial in situations in
which the ability of the owner to hold out is thought to be problem-
atic.  Although the U.S. Constitution and many state constitutions do
require that taken property be put to a public use, the weakness of
this requirement in the hands of many courts means that the main
constraints on the use of the eminent domain power are its cumber-
someness and any political opposition aroused by the possibility of its
exercise in a given situation.45
The law of private necessity bears some resemblance to eminent
domain, especially in its reliance on liability rules, but private neces-
sity is even more restricted by legal requirements.  In the law of pri-
vate necessity, a private party in mortal peril can take an owner’s
resource and pay damages later.  In situations of necessity, requiring
the person in peril to negotiate with an entitlement holder protected
by a property rule is likely to lead to high, perhaps prohibitive, costs
of exchange, and to a danger of hold-out behavior as well.  The lia-
bility rule literature relies on two leading cases of necessity relating to
42 To be precise, the “price” under each system must include transaction costs in the
case of the market price and the costs of using the judicial process in the case of damages
under the liability rule.
43 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 170–71, 175–81
(1988) (noting problem and suggesting damages as solution); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16, 68–69, 79–81 (5th ed. 1998) (same); Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 1, at 1106–10 (same); see also Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Prop- R
erty:  The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25–27 (1985) (describing potential inef-
ficiencies of injunctive relief in nuisance disputes); Polinsky, supra note 5, at 4 (analyzing R
potential solutions to strategic behavior); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Dis-
putes:  The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075,
1076 (1980) (discussing arguments against injunctions in nuisance disputes based on possi-
bility of extortion and strategic behavior).
44 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (ordering trial court to grant injunction to be
vacated upon payment by defendant of permanent damages); see supra note 43.  But see R
Smith, supra note 4 (claiming that usual argument for liability rules is overstated and that R
presumption for property rules in nuisance should be strong).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 77–81 (1986) (noting “due process” costs of exercising eminent-domain power).
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ships in storms.  In Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.,46 the ship
owner maintained a mooring to the dock after the discharge of cargo
because of a storm, and the dock suffered damage as a result.  The
court held that although the ship owner acted reasonably and justifi-
ably, it had to pay for the damage to the dock.47  Thus, the dock is
protected by a property rule most of the time, but in situations of
necessity the level of protection drops to that of a liability rule.  The
one in peril can take and pay, but after the peril passes, the property
rule reasserts itself.  If in some sense part or all of the entitlement to
the dock passes to the one in need, it is interesting to consider what
the consequences would be if the dock owner tried to unmoor the
ship.
In Ploof v. Putnam, the dock owner’s servant did just that,
unmooring the ship and causing it to be driven onto the shore and the
people and cargo on board to be tossed into the water.48  The court
held that the ship owner could sue the dock owner, confirming that
the one in peril has a right rather than a mere privilege to use the
dock.49
Commentators have differed over the strength and scope of this
right.  According to Ayres and Balkin, there is a second-order liability
rule under which the dock owner would have to pay damages to the
ship owner for “retaking” the entitlement to the dock.50  Richard
Epstein counters that, during the peril, the ship’s crew have the “enti-
tlement” to the dock protected by a property rule, not a liability rule,
because if the dock owner tried to unmoor the ship, the crew could
defend with deadly force and, according to Epstein, the outside
entrant becomes the owner of the dock for the duration of the neces-
sity.51  The court’s decision itself only hints at the scope of the shifted
entitlement in those on the ship.  Because the opinion resolved only
that the plaintiff had stated a case, we do not know whether punitive
damages were granted.  The fact that one of the ship owner-plaintiff’s
46 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
47 Id. at 222.
48 Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 188–89 (Vt. 1908).
49 Id. at 189.  Because the right here correlates with a duty in the dock owner to allow
the ship to moor, this is a true claim-right in the Hohfeldian sense, as opposed to a mere
privilege. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 36–39, 71–72 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919).
50 Ayres & Balkin, supra note 30, at 715–16. R
51 Epstein, supra note 6, at 2108–09.  As Epstein points out, the owner could not R
“retake” the entitlement, but rather the property rule protection temporarily shifts to the
boat owner because protecting life is more important than a refined “auction” of the dock.
Id. at 2109–10.
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counts sounded in trespass suggests, however, that property rule pro-
tection was available.52
Liability rules are used only in narrow settings like necessity, and
they are further hedged about with institutional limitations.  Epstein
emphasizes that liability rule–type regimes in takings law, nineteenth-
century mill act legislation, the law of common carriers, and related
regulatory regimes require a public body to set rates and protect the
“takee.”53  The mill acts, which used liability rules to overcome poten-
tial hold-out problems, are famous in the liability rule literature for
their provisions allowing those building mills to flood upstream land
but requiring the payment of 150% of the market price as officially
determined damages.54  Ayres and Balkin interpret this provision as
reflecting an effort to estimate the average value that upstream land-
owners place on their land.55  But as Epstein points out, the mill acts
were far from a pure liability rule regime.56  There were two types of
mill acts.  Some statutes conferred the power of eminent domain on
riparian landowners, which allowed the mill builder to pay the value
of the condemned land as determined by a jury and then to receive
title.57  In these acts, mill builders were not allowed to flood and pay,
but had to get prior authorization from the authorities after showing
that the proposed mill was in the public interest.  Other mill acts gave
owners of riparian land the right to proceed at their peril to build a
water mill, but allowed an objecting landowner not only to sue for
damages but also to seek a determination that the mill was not in the
public interest.58  If the mill were found not to be in the public
interest, presumably the adversely affected owner could then sue for
an injunction to have it torn down.  As is true generally, the entitle-
ment of the neighboring landowners here is protected by a hybrid of
52 Ploof, 71 A. at 189.
53 Epstein, supra note 6, at 2111–20. R
54 E.g. Act of July 3, 1868, ch. 20, § 3, 1868 N.H. Laws 152, 152–53; see also Head v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 10 n.* (1885) (quoting New Hampshire mill act). But see
John F. Hart, The Maryland Mill Act, 1669–1766:  Economic Policy and the Confiscatory
Redistribution of Private Property, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4 (1995) (noting that 1669
Maryland mill act authorized transfer “for compensation that was below the value of the
land”).
55 Ayres & Balkin, supra note 30, at 742 (“The legislature might have believed that the R
average upstream landowner (who has not sold her house) has an average value which is
fifty percent above the market price.”).  Epstein argues that the statute ensures that in the
usual case only farmland, not houses, would be flooded.  Epstein, supra note 6, at 2115. R
56 Epstein, supra note 6, at 2114. R
57 John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the
Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (2000).  The New Hampshire mill act in
Head v. Amoskeag appears to be of this second type. Head, 113 U.S. at 10–11.
58 Hart, supra note 57, at 1116. R
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property and liability rule protection, and liability rule protection is a
grudging exception.
Likewise, the liability rule literature could cite various private
eminent domain–like mechanisms prevalent in western states, but
these too are highly circumscribed.  The high stakes involved in water
rights led states to adopt statutes granting those with insufficient
stream access easements for ditches to streams over intervening land.
From early on, liability rule protection for the owner of the servient
estate has been common; the irrigator has to pay for damage caused
by the ditches through the servient land.59  But these regimes are not
pure take-and-pay court-administered liability rules; prior application
to officials, hearings, bonds, and compensation are required.60  Simi-
larly, because of the “checkerboard” method by which the federal
government disposed of lands,61 easement-by-necessity doctrines
giving landlocked owners nonconsensual access through neighboring
private lands are common in the western United States, but here too
institutional safeguards as well as compensation requirements apply.62
(By contrast, the more familiar doctrine of easement by private neces-
sity in eastern states only applies between parcels that were once
59 E.g. Act of Nov. 5, 1861, §§ 5–7, 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67, 68.  Note that in the Idaho
statute quoted in note 60 infra, the safeguards of eminent domain are incorporated by R
reference to the law of eminent domain.  The Wyoming statute, also quoted in note 60, R
infra, incorporates the elaborate procedural safeguards and compensation requirement of
the procedure for opening private roads.
60 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-1106 (Michie 2003) (“In case of the refusal of the owners
or claimants of any lands, through which any ditch, canal or conduit is proposed to be
made or constructed, to allow passage thereof, the person or persons desiring the right of
way may proceed as in the law of eminent domain.”).  For example, Wyoming law provides
that:
Upon the presentation of a petition signed by at least five (5) freeholders of
any neighborhood, praying for passage to any watercourse for the purpose of
watering livestock, or for the convenient access to timber, the board of county
commissioners may, in their discretion, establish such water or timber way as
provided in W.S. 24-9-101 through 24-9-103 relating to the opening of private
roads.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-104 (Michie 2003).
61 The checkerboard pattern results from federal grants of alternate 640-acre sections
of the public lands to various private and state parties, notably from federal grants to rail-
roads of over 100 million acres between 1850 and 1872.  The railroads received the odd-
numbered sections and the United States retained the even-numbered sections, leading to
acute access issues today. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492
(granting land to Union Pacific Railroad); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,
672–77 (1979) (recounting history of railroad land grants); PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND
LAW COMM’N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 357–68, 371–80 (1968)
(same).
62 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9-101, 24-9-103 (Michie 2003); see also Leo Sheep
Co., 440 U.S. at 679–80 & n.16 (discussing law of easement by necessity and “private”
eminent domain in western states).
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united and so governs relations between a grantor and his successors
on the one hand and a grantee and his successors on the other, as a
default rule in a situation already governed by contract.63)  Both the
mill acts and the western easement–liability rule regimes are narrowly
tailored to situations of high hold-out potential and are subject to
elaborate safeguards for the benefit of the owners of the proposed
servient land.
Another almost forgotten example of exceptional but limited
replacement of property rules with liability rules is the regime gov-
erning farmer-miner conflict in mid-nineteenth-century California.64
Would-be gold miners often entered agricultural land and discovered
minerals.  Although these disputes occurred on public lands, the
policy at the time called for disposition to private parties.  (Most of
the lands had not yet been classified as mineral or nonmineral; if they
had been classified as the former, then agriculturalists would have had
no right to claim them under the state Possessory Act of 1850.)65  The
farmers could argue that, in the common law, first in time is first in
right, and that they had invested in valuable improvements.66  On the
other hand, the miners could argue that mining—even the chance of
finding minerals—was more important than farming in the area, and
at first the California Supreme Court (to which Justice Field was not
yet appointed) agreed.67  As a compromise, the California Legislature
passed the Indemnification Act of 1855, which allowed miners to enter
and search for minerals and pay for any damage—a liability rule
regime.68  But, as in many of the mill acts and western provisions for
63 See, e.g., Goulding v. Cook, 661 N.E.2d 1322, 1323–25 (Mass. 1996) (holding that
court could not order one landowner to grant another easement for compensation because
this would amount to private eminent domain).  On easements by necessity in grantor-
grantee situations, see, for example, Hollywyle Ass’n v. Hollister, 324 A.2d 247 (Conn.
1973), and 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.07 (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., 2004).
64 See generally Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Develop-
ment in California, 1850–1866:  A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth-
Century America, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 235 (1976).
65 The Possessory Act, like the Homestead Act, permitted settlers to occupy up to 160
acres of public lands but forbade settlement upon mineral bearing land.  Act of Apr. 11,
1850, ch. 83, §§ 1–2, 1850 Cal. Stat. 203, 203.  This provision was amended in 1852 to allow
miners to prospect on agricultural land.  Act of Apr. 20, 1852, ch. 532, § 1, 1852 Cal. Stat.
158, 158–59; see McCurdy, supra note 64, at 246. R
66 See McCurdy, supra note 64, at 247–48. R
67 McClintock v. Bryden, 5 Cal. 97, 101–02 (1855) (equating “interests of the people”
with interests of “the mining public”).
68 Act of Apr. 25, 1855, ch. 119, § 2, 1855 Cal. Stat. 145, 145.  McCurdy notes that “[t]he
Indemnification Act had ample precedent in French and Spanish, if not in Anglo-Amer-
ican law,” but also notes that on the continent the state owned subsurface precious metals.
McCurdy, supra note 64, at 249 & n.72. R
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easements by necessity, the California legislation required prior
approval from a justice of the peace.69  Even this protection was not
enough for Justice Field and other California Supreme Court justices,
who were alarmed by the potential destabilizing effects of the
quasi–liability rule system on the general property regime.  After con-
struing the Act as narrowly as possible, they finally held it invalid in
the 1860 case of Gillan v. Hutchinson.70
There are (at least) two stories that could be told about this epi-
sode, one about rent-seeking and another about efficiency.71  From
the former perspective, the miners were a very organized lobby group
that sought and gained rents in the legislative arena, which were later
lost in the courts.  In striking down the legislation, the court was rep-
resenting the public interest in a stable property system or responding
to the needs of other property owners, and farmers in particular.
Alternatively, to be more optimistic about the legislation, one might
argue that California in the 1850s was exceptional in that it was abun-
dantly clear that mining was generally the highest-value use of land.
The liability rule legislation then indeed would function as a tempo-
rary transaction-cost-lowering device.  (One might even search for
some evidence that farmers were working the land in order to gain the
hold-out power.)  But, as information improved as to which lands
were likely to contain minerals, general norms of property protection
reasserted themselves.  No doubt a variety of factors played a role
here, but the fate of this legislation in the hands of Justice Field and
the California Supreme Court only underscores the exceptional status
of liability rule regimes in the law.  That this particular regime is
largely forgotten and never served as much of a precedent for other
conflicts over land use also reinforces this point.
69 The Indemnification Act provided that:
Whenever any person, for mining purposes, shall desire to occupy or use any
mineral lands of this State, then occupied by . . . improvements, [or] property
of another, such person shall first give bond to the owner of the . . . improve-
ment[s], to be approved by a Justice of the Peace of the township . . . in a sum
to be fixed by three disinterested citizens . . . .
70 § 2, 1855 Cal. Stat. at 145.
16 Cal. 154, 157 (1860); see McCurdy, supra note 64, at 250–51 (discussing California R
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation and eventual invalidation of Indemnification Act).
71 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002) (arguing that virtually any transition to or from private-property
regime can be explained by either optimistic transaction-cost-lowering story or competing
suspicion-inducing interest-group story); see also Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Prop-
erty Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S369–71 (2002) (arguing that oligarchs are in posi-
tion to overcome obstacles in way of transitions between property regimes, and why this
would or would not tend toward efficiency).
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Property scholars have advanced a number of justifications for
property rules that reflect the same traditional concerns about sta-
bility of ownership and incentives to invest that concerned the Field
court.  Richard Epstein argues that any rule system must balance the
opposing risks of undercompensation and hold-out behavior, and that
in practice the undercompensation concerns usually outweigh the
hold-out problem.  If so, this would account for the widespread use of
property rules.72
Carol Rose also presents a defense of property rules by pointing
out that different areas of the law, and property in particular, call for
different treatment in terms of liability and property rules.73  She
argues that the implicit motivating example—the “shadow” para-
digm—in the liability rule literature is the law of accidents and the law
of contracts.74  Property rules tend to be associated with property, and
liability rules do not adequately protect the incentives for planning
and investment.
Rose distinguishes between two types of transaction costs.  Type I
transaction costs are the costs of finding and assembling the large or
indefinite class of potentially interested parties, and Type II transac-
tion costs are the costs of bargaining, such as strategic behavior.75
One branch of the liability rule literature focuses on Type II costs, but
there may be antecedent costs in just setting up the bargaining
problem.  To this we might add that the entitlements—and liability
rule versus property rule is part of the contour of the entitlement—
will present a more or less costly message to those who must respect
the right.76  Note that the class Rose identifies in her Type I transac-
tion-cost situation as “numerous or indistinctly definite” corresponds
well with the characteristics of in rem dutyholders.77  Property is an in
rem right and the need of third parties—potentially the “rest of the
world”—to incur information costs in dealing with these rights will be
an argument for keeping them simple and standardized.78  As I will
argue, property rules do a better job of that.
72 Epstein, supra note 6, at 2094–95. R
73 Rose, supra note 6, at 2176–77, 2179–80, 2187. R
74 Id. at 2187, 2196–97.
75 Id. at 2184.
76 See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text. R
77 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 783–86 (2001) (breaking notion of in rem legal relation into elements
of numerosity and indefiniteness of dutyholders).
78 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24–42 (2000); Merrill & Smith,
supra note 77, at 799–809. R
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B. The Case for Liability Rules
In their article, Calabresi and Melamed went beyond classifying
remedies and proposed some criteria for choosing between property
rules and liability rules.  They suggested that property rules are supe-
rior where transaction costs are low and liability rules are preferred
where transaction costs are high; this has been the traditional
approach taken in law and economics.79  Recently many commenta-
tors have questioned this division of labor and have pointed to the
advantages of liability rules even where bargaining is feasible.  I will
call this more pro–liability rule position the “modern” one.
Underlying the traditional emphasis on property rules in situa-
tions of low transaction costs, first articulated by Calabresi and
Melamed and prevalent until the 1990s, is a preference for voluntary
transactions; liability rules are a substitute for prices where transac-
tions are too costly.80  Of course, if the administrative costs of a lia-
bility rule also outweigh the benefits, then the liability rule is not
warranted.81  Consider a situation in which a transfer of an entitle-
ment (or a piece of an entitlement) would produce a gain of $100, say
because the asset is worth $100 more in B’s hands than in A’s.  Then
any institutional arrangement that can capture the $100 benefit at a
cost of less than $100 would potentially increase efficiency.  The tradi-
tional view recognizes two methods by which this might occur:  (i) a
voluntary transaction between A, whose entitlement is protected by a
property rule, and B, who pays a price in a consensual transaction of
up to $100 minus the costs of transacting, and (ii) a taking from A,
whose entitlement is protected by a liability rule, by B, who pays the
officially determined compensation to A.  This compensation might be
derived from the market price of A in some other context or from
some estimate of harm to people like A.  Again, on the traditional
view, the choice between (i) and (ii) turns largely on the level of trans-
action costs; when they are low there is no need for a court to deter-
mine a “price” for the taking because the parties will bargain to one
anyway.
The modern view challenges this picture in several respects.  First,
it questions whether property rules are superior where transaction
costs are low.  Why wouldn’t A and B negotiate in the shadow of the
79 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. R
80 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. R
81 Courts’ determinations of damages may be costly in just those situations in which
transaction costs for a voluntary exchange would be high. See Krier & Schwab, supra note
5, at 453–54. R
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 24  3-NOV-04 14:56
1742 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1719
liability rule?82  At least A would not be able to hold out as easily
under the liability rule because B could take and pay the officially
determined damages.  More generally, liability rules may force one
party to reveal something about its valuation, thereby alleviating
problems of asymmetric information.83  The modern liability rule liter-
ature further complicates the traditional approach by placing liability
rules and property rules on a spectrum based on the level of the “com-
pensation” to A.84  Liability rules with more than market-level dam-
ages may be appropriate to compensate for subjective value in thin
market settings.  The term “property rule” then comes to be associ-
ated with very high levels of liability and injunctions that prevent all
or nearly all involuntary takings.
The question then becomes what level of damages is appropriate
in order to give the correct ex ante incentives and achieve allocative
efficiency.  Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, building on work by A.
Mitchell Polinksy, argue that liability rules are generally superior if
compensation is pegged at average harm to victims.85  As long as the
harm to A is not correlated with the benefit to B, and a court’s esti-
mate of the average harm to those in A’s position is not systematically
biased, then making B face the average harm will get B’s incentives
exactly right.  Kaplow and Shavell conclude that liability rules are
superior to property rules “on average . . . regardless of how imperfect
the state’s information is about harm or prevention cost.”86  Also, in
Kaplow and Shavell’s view, the need to estimate average harm is not a
significant barrier to using liability rules.  They believe that this can be
done with minimal information, and, as long as there is no systematic
bias, the Bs of the world will expect the average damage award to be
equal to the average harm of victims and will act efficiently.87
One great attraction of this result is that it would appear that,
informationally, liability rules must be superior to property rules.  In
what I have termed elsewhere the “information subset” argument, lia-
bility rules on this account require only a subset, most probably a
82 See generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 5, at 1032; see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, R
Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105
YALE L.J. 235 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bar-
gaining?  A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995).  For an argument that
liability rules can be less efficient because they remove the incentives that harsh property
rules gives parties to bargain cooperatively, see Krier & Schwab, supra note 5, at 464. R
83 Ayres & Talley, supra note 5, at 1032. R
84 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 756–57. R
85 See id. at 727–28, 776–79; see also Polinsky, supra note 5, at 24–30; Polinsky, supra R
note 43, at 1093–95, 1100–02. R
86 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 727 (emphasis omitted).
87 See id. at 728, 776–79.
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proper subset, of the information that property rules require.88  On
the information-subset argument, to decide whether A or B should
get property rule protection one must know which party values the
entitlement more, which will often require one to know both their
values.89  By contrast, with liability rules, one need know only the
average harm of the victim and then can let the potential tortfeasor
compare the potential damages he would have to pay with the benefits
of the taking (or refraining from taking).  If the average damages for a
person like A are $60, then B will take if and only if B’s value exceeds
$60 and not otherwise.
But the information-subset argument does not hold if the prop-
erty rule can be based on rougher information than the liability rule,
although Kaplow and Shavell seem to discount this possibility in an
empirical guess.90  The information-subset argument also assumes a
static world and fails in a dynamic world in which parties can change
their activities to avoid the costs of liability rules.  In such a dynamic
world, it is possible that takers can anticipate and respond to the infor-
mational factors that a court will use to value an entitlement, in order
to make damages appear to be less than they really are.  And if takers
are able to do this more easily under the liability rule than under the
corresponding property rule, the property rule can come out ahead.91
Once again, the responsiveness of various kinds of behavior is an
empirical matter.
Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell recognize that liability rules
are not as widespread as their information-harnessing result implies
they ought to be.  They develop two exceptions to the pro–liability
88 See Smith, supra note 6, at 684–86.  Kaplow and Shavell make what I call the “infor- R
mation-subset argument” in response to the possible objection that courts may not have
enough information on average harm for the liability rule and that the property rule avoids
the need for this estimate:
But this view is specious.  It ignores the fact that a court must make some
estimate of harm in selecting which property rule to apply:  to decide whether
it is victims or injurers who are to be accorded property rule protection, courts
must determine whether the harm or the prevention cost is greater, which
requires that the court estimate both.  Whatever the court’s estimate of harm
is, the same estimate can be used to set damages under a liability rule.  And, as
we have explained at length, this rule will be superior to a property rule based
on the same information (essentially because errors in estimating harm plague
both rules but errors in estimating prevention costs hinder only property
rules).
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 729 (citation omitted). R
89 For the view that it may not, see, for example, Brooks, supra note 6, and Smith, R
supra note 6, at 685–86. R
90 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 729 n.49. R
91 See Smith, supra note 6, at 686–96 (arguing that when quality is variable, informa- R
tional-subset argument favoring liability rules no longer holds).
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rule prescription, which lead to what might be termed an “interme-
diate” position that retains elements of the traditional view.  They
make an empirical claim that liability rules tend not to be used to
protect tangible assets.92  They ask why the information-harnessing of
the average-expected-harm approach to liability rules does not work
well in general for tangible assets, as opposed to intangible rights such
as their canonical example of rights to pollute or to be free from pollu-
tion.  They assert that tangible assets are not protected by liability
rules because of the problems of repeated, reciprocal takings and cor-
related values.93  Multiple or reciprocal takings can arise when A and
B both value the asset more than the average.  If the average harm to
people like A is $50 but A’s actual value is $75, then a B with a value
of $60 will take even though the asset should remain in A’s hands. A
might then respond by taking from B, and B from A, etc.  This will
often be possible in the case of tangible assets if they have not been
consumed yet and many potential takers have access to the thing.94
By contrast, in the pollution case when B “takes” A’s entitlement, A
may not be in any position to physically take it back and only one or a
few potential takers are in a position to take.
Kaplow and Shavell’s second qualification is that liability rules
break down in the face of common or correlated values, which tan-
gible assets, in their view, often present.95  If A and B value the asset
for the same reasons, then the harm to A and the benefit to B will be
correlated and the average-harm principle will lead to too much
taking.  Thus, the intermediate position tries to explain the prevalence
of property rules for protecting entitlements to tangible assets on the
grounds that wasteful multiple takings and excessive takings based on
correlated values will dissipate the general information-harnessing
advantages of liability rules.96  In the presence of correlated values
and multiple takings, owners’ incentives to invest in assets will be
diminished, thus capturing part of the traditional concern among
property theorists with the need for security and the ability to reap
where one has sown.97
It should be noted that Kaplow and Shavell’s intermediate posi-
tion does not extend as far as traditional property theory—or as the
92 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 758, 771–74. R
93 See id. at 767–68.
94 Id. at 759–63.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 762.
97 Id. at 765–77; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules:
The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 619–32 (2001) (showing that in
comparison to traditional liability rules, property rules can induce under- or over-invest-
ment ex ante); infra note 109. R
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information cost theory presented below—would suggest.  For
Kaplow and Shavell, the things rightly protected by property rules are
tangible things, as opposed to “externality” problems and intangible
entitlements.  Traditional property theory would not draw such a
sharp distinction between intangible externalities and conflicts over
tangible things.98  A pollution nuisance interferes with the victim’s
right to a thing—her land.  As I argue elsewhere, the law of nuisance
is not the free-floating balancing of uses implemented by liability rules
that the Kaplow and Shavell analysis and other liability rule proposals
would suggest.99  Furthermore, the opportunism problem identified by
Kaplow and Shavell is too limited; it puts great weight on the possi-
bility of multiple takings, which they believe do not generally occur in
the “externality” context.100  I will argue, however, that the problem
of opportunism is a general one that includes a risk of extortion by
even a single potential taker,101 and that the exclusion strategy plays
an important role in protecting owners from such opportunism.  More
generally, I will argue that our talk of “things” is epiphenomenal to a
delegation of use-choice to owners through the exclusion strategy,
making the property rule approach more widely applicable than
Kaplow and Shavell are willing to concede:  In ordinary legal dis-
course we speak of things and rights to them when, partly for reasons
of information costs, we have chosen to employ the exclusion strategy
rather than a governance strategy focused on activities and
“externalities.”
Another instability in the intermediate pro–liability rule position
is that more recently commentators have questioned this intermediate
position by showing that properly tailored damages can avoid the
problems with both multiple takings and correlated values.  One way
around the problem of multiple takings is to have the liability rule
protecting A be protected in turn with another liability rule with a
higher “exercise price.”  According to Ian Ayres and J.M. Balkin, the
takings and retakings will not go on indefinitely but will produce ever-
better information about values.102  The retakings will stop once one
party, in our example A, values the entitlement more.  In effect, the
system of takings and retakings works as an auction, and it is an
empirical question whether this mechanism is worth its cost.  Ayres
98 Smith, supra note 4, at 999–1000 (describing more- and less-tangible invasions and R
harms); see also Rose, supra note 6, at 2188–97 (noting common value problem in common R
pool externalities).
99 Smith, supra note 4. R
100 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 771–73. R
101 See infra Parts III.A–B.
102 Ayres & Balkin, supra note 30, at 709–14. R
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and Balkin, like Kaplow and Shavell, are optimistic that administra-
tive costs will not be so high as to make their scheme unrealistic.103
Turning to the claim about correlated values, Ian Ayres and Paul
Goldbart argue that Kaplow and Shavell are mistaken about corre-
lated values because they did not consider a wide enough range of
tailored liability rules.104  Kaplow and Shavell did suggest a couple of
alternatives, such as damages of shared value plus average idiosyn-
cratic value, but they did not pursue the matter.105  Ayres and
Goldbart show that property rules are less efficient than a rule of
damages set at the mean expected victim value conditional on taker’s
actual value at the point where this conditional mean equals taker’s
actual value.106  This is an extension of Kaplow and Shavell’s expected
average harm approach in that the new Ayres and Goldbart rule
reduces to an average-victim-harm rule in the special case of uncorre-
lated values.107
One theme that emerges from the pro-liability literature is its
heavy reliance on the ability of actors—takers, takees, and officials—
to collect information about the distribution of values and to estimate
averages.  If the resulting averages are not biased, ex ante efficiency
can be ensured if actors face liability based on these averages.  Put
differently, proponents of liability rules assume that the estimated
averages for purposes of damages will be equal to the expected values
that primary actors should act on.  If so, everyone will have efficient
incentives ex ante and property rules cannot improve on matters;
indeed, they can only make things worse.  If actors can correctly ascer-
tain probability information about payoffs, then an inability to gather
other information does not prevent the optimal result from being
reached.
This pro–liability rule position is meant to defuse the defenses of
property rules.  To the concern about investment incentives, a
pro–liability rule commentator might respond that there is no reason
that investment cannot be protected by a liability rule.  Pro–liability
rule commentators also tend to disagree with those in the
pro–property rule camp on the relative magnitudes of both the hold-
out and undercompensation problems.  First, they see widespread
problems of strategic behavior, including holding out and the with-
holding of private information.108  Further, the pro–liability rule com-
103 Id. at 733–36.
104 Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 3. R
105 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 762 n.157. R
106 Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 3, at 134–39. R
107 Id. at 136.
108 See sources cited supra note 5. R
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mentators do not see any principled reason why liability rules should
be undercompensatory.  In particular, incentives would not change on
an expected basis if the average expected harm rule or one of the
more sophisticated variants were used in place of the law’s present
undercompensatory objective-market-damages approach.  In a con-
flict between A and B over a resource, if A is the owner and has
invested in the asset, to the extent possible damages should reflect the
efficient level of investment by A.109  More particularly, by giving
damages measured in the amount of average harm (or based on Ayres
and Goldbart’s more elaborate conditional average expected victim
value) investment can be built into the notion of value.  If the level of
damages is the correct one, then ex ante investment incentives will be
neither too great nor too small.  A very analogous debate has raged in
the patent literature, where many commentators have argued that
protecting a patent holder’s entitlement with a liability rule—through
forced buy-outs or compulsory licensing—can give the correct incen-
tives to invest resources in producing and commercializing
inventions.110
As in the patent context, I will argue that these critiques of the
property rule paradigm miss something.111  In a world in which uses
were known (or at least their average values were known), we might
109 Lucian Bebchuk analyzes the ex ante incentives for investment of property rules and
liability rules.  Bebchuk, supra note 97.  Bebchuk does not include the more tailored dam- R
ages considered by Ayres and Balkin, supra note 30, Ayres and Goldbart, supra note 3, at R
134–39, or Avraham, supra note 5.  Further, from the present point of view, Bebchuk’s R
article, like the rest of the liability rule literature, treats property as a list of use rights and
the conflict between A and B as one of two preselected uses.  But on the traditional under-
standing, property reflects a decision—ex ante to Bebchuk’s ex ante—to delegate the
choice among an indefinite set of uses to the owner.  As I will show, this second-order
choice of the chooser has to be protected by a property rule. See infra Part III.A.
110 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS
IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts:  A Mechanism for
Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998). But see, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property
Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001)
(arguing that commercialization function requires property rule protection for patents).
Interestingly, the most well-developed proposals for patent prizes explicitly rest on the
notion that those who might engage in innovation will face an unbiased, ex ante, corrected
expected reward. See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV.
115, 123–24 (2003); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual
Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 534–35 (2001).  This result is vulnerable, however, to
actors’ abilities to anticipate and manipulate the criteria used by officials to value inven-
tions, in a way I discuss in Part III.B infra.  For a discussion of compulsory licensing in
other countries’ patent systems and the general lack of compulsory licensing in U.S. patent
law despite numerous proposals, see Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for
Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275.
111 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:  An Information Cost
Approach (Feb. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with New York University Law
Review).
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expect the law to rely a great deal more on liability rules than it does.
But in our world, even specifying uses and gathering them into appro-
priate “classes” for purposes of averaging is a complex and costly task.
These difficulties lead directly to the information-cost advantage of
property rules.
There is a tension between the assumption that actors can use
probability distributions on the one hand and positive transaction
costs on the other.112  In particular, dividing the world up into
“classes” for actuarial purposes is an example of transaction costs in
the broad sense.113  Resources must be consumed to produce this kind
of information, and actors—owners, potential takers, and officials—
may differ systematically in their ability to produce this information.
In the following section, I will argue that, in suppressing this actu-
arial dimension of the information problem, the pro–liability rule
literature is correct on its own terms but misses important advantages
of property rules, advantages that allow us to explain why property
rules are so prevalent.  In particular, I will question the assumptions
that an official’s task is to evaluate preselected uses and that the
values of these uses can be treated in sensible actuarial classes with
nonbiased averages.  Instead, property rules will be advantageous pre-
cisely where the set of relevant uses is indefinite and actors differ in
their ability to generate information, actuarial or otherwise, about
those assets.
C. Three Aspects of Remedies
Although most of the law-and-economics literature speaks of
property rules and liability rules as alternatives for defining and pro-
tecting entitlements, there are actually several related distinctions
between more robust and less robust remedies.  These include (i) how
strong the remedy is, (ii) what shape describes the overall function
from activity levels to liability levels, and (iii) whether the “unit of
concern” of the regime is prices or quantities.  These three aspects are
related to each other, but distinguishing them will set the stage for a
theory of the advantages of property rules.
The literature on property rules versus liability rules mostly
focuses on the first of our three questions, the robustness of the
112 Maskin and Tirole point out a similar tension in the incomplete-contracts literature
between the assumption of positive transaction costs and the assumption that parties are
able to perform dynamic programming. See Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Con-
tingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83, 84 (1999).
113 For an argument that transaction costs are better defined as the costs of establishing
property rights (in the economist’s sense) rather than narrowly as the costs of exchange,
see Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1991).
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remedy and its consequences for the probability of consensual versus
nonconsensual transactions.  According to Calabresi and Melamed’s
original definition, a property rule is designed to force a potential
taker to pay what the owner asks in a consensual transaction, whereas
liability rules give the taker an option to take and pay officially deter-
mined damages.114  Usually these damages are designed to mimic a
hypothetical market price, but they may be pegged at average harm or
some other nonpunitive level.115
Property rules and liability rules are properly thought of as dif-
ferent ways of defining the scope of entitlements in the domain of
transfer, rather than simply as “remedies” protecting entitlements.116
But property rules and liability rules do tend to be associated with
different remedies, which can be distinguished as prices or sanctions.
Robert Cooter uses “price” to refer to a payment that must be made
to do something permitted, and “sanction” to refer to a payment or
other punishment for doing what is not allowed.117  Because a noncon-
sensual taking is prohibited under a property rule but allowed by a
liability rule, it is no surprise that property rules are backed by sanc-
tions and liability rules by prices.
But Cooter also usefully distinguishes sanctions and prices based
on an answer to the second of the three questions above—what shape
the liability function takes.  Actors may face different levels of liability
for different levels of activity.  One way to distinguish different lia-
bility functions is to focus on their shape.118  Some liability regimes
impose a continuously increasing level of liability for increasing levels
of harmful activity, and Cooter identifies these as prices.119  Other
rules, including the sanction rules that prohibit a wrongful act, are
114 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092. R
115 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 756–57. R
116 See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE
L.J. 1335, 1345 (1986) (arguing that property, liability, and inalienability rules are usefully
viewed as mathematical functions ultimately specifying content of entitlement over domain
of transfer); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules:  A Better View of the
Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 840–41 (1997) (arguing that traditional formulation of dis-
tinction between property rules and liability rules conflates guidance and enforcement
rules); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three’s a Crowd:  A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and
Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 412–17 (1999) (providing
feminist critique of view that liability rules and property rules are alternate methods of
protecting same entitlement).
117 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524–25 (1984); see
also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
68–69 (1970) (outlining scheme of price-like specific deterrence and sanction-like general
deterrence).
118 See Cooter, supra note 117, at 1525–31. R
119 See id. at 1528.
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associated with a bent curve; liability takes a jump at a certain level of
activity.120
Consider a case of prices, which impose a continuously increasing
private cost on the actor that corresponds to the external harm,
thereby internalizing it to that actor.  The price allows individuals to
perform the relevant cost-benefit analysis, and officials need to know
the external cost of the activity but not the optimal level of the
activity.  Strict liability in tort and Pigovian taxes both are systems of
(nonmarket) prices.  Sanctions, by contrast, impose a cost described
by a bent function; the private cost to the actor jumps at the point
where behavior fails to meet the standard.  Sanctions are best
employed where the standard of proper behavior is known but the
level of external harm is not.121  The use of the sanction (or a subsidy)
with a jump will also be favored where the choices involved are dis-
continuous and the rulemakers know which of the discontinuous
choices is better.122  The remedies for trespass, including punitive
damages and injunctions, are sanctions that kick in only when a
boundary has been crossed.  Many pollution regulations involve fines
for exceeding a certain level of emissions.  Even the negligence stan-
dard in tort is associated with a sanction because actors can escape
liability by exercising reasonable care; once care falls below that stan-
dard, actors suddenly become liable for victims’ injuries.123
In addition to the different shapes of their cost functions, prices
and sanctions are distinguished to a lesser extent by the level of dam-
ages:  Sanctions sometimes involve supracompensatory remedies,
even on an expected basis, whereas prices set damages equal to
harm.124  Consider a supracompensatory remedy, which is what will be
associated with a property rule.  If those meeting the standard defined
120 See id. at 1526–27.
121 For example, this can be true when a community standard has developed. Id. at
1532–37.
122 Cf. id. at 1548–50 (adapting model to criminal laws aimed at discontinuous choices
with optima at corners).
123 Id. at 1538–40.
124 If the probability of detection is less than 100% then to get the correct price on an
expected basis one would have to divide the compensatory damage level by the probability
of detection. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence:  When and
How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1149–66 (1989); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1982); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:  An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV.
869, 887–96 (1998); see also, e.g., POSNER, supra note 43, at 77–78; Jeremy Bentham, Prin- R
ciples of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365, 401–02 (John Bowring
ed., 1962); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87
GEO. L.J. 421, 423 (1998) (arguing that multiplier approach is appropriate when offender’s
gain probably exceeds victim’s loss, but that otherwise damages should aim to remove
offender’s gain).
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in the rule are charged zero, and those not meeting the standard are
charged a supracompensatory amount, then by definition we have
what Cooter would call a sanction; the costs imposed on actors must
take a jump.  In the case of liability rules, liability can jump from zero
to the value of the harm (as in negligence), or it can rise continuously
along with marginal harm (as in strict liability).
Closely related to the shape of the liability function is the third
question above, the informational focus of the liability regime.
Cooter points out that prices require knowledge of marginal harm
whereas sanctions require knowledge of the standard of behavior.125
The liability rule literature also addresses this question when it speaks
of information harnessing:  Under liability rules, courts are said not to
need to know the right level of an activity but only the external harm
(or some more sophisticated variant).126  This concern about the infor-
mation required for legal regimes surfaces very explicitly in the envi-
ronmental-economics literature where the problem is whether to
couch rules in terms of “prices” or “quantities.”127  Property rules and
sanctions will thus require different information from that needed for
liability rules and prices.  Liability rules and prices often require sig-
nals or proxies that measure marginal harm, whereas property rules
and sanctions depend on signals that correlate with a standard of
behavior.  For this reason, rules of access (exclusion) are property
rules backed up by sanctions; the signals involved in defining property
rights on the basis of access are not related to the marginal value of
harm but are closer to being binary.  Does the actor have permitted
access or not?128  By contrast, use rules (governance) employ signals
related to activities and actors.  These may relate to level of harm or
they may define a standard of proper use that does not tell us directly
about the level of harm.  Thus, governance rules may be associated
either with liability rules and prices or with property rules and
sanctions.
Nonetheless, the creation of more detailed use-based rules may
be complementary to gathering information about marginal harm, so
125 Cooter, supra note 117, at 1532–37. R
126 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. R
127 See, e.g., Martin L. Weizman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974)
(presenting model of when regulation in terms of prices or quantities will be superior, and
finding quantity regulation to be superior in some circumstances of uncertainty); Gary W.
Yohe, Towards a General Comparison of Price Controls and Quantity Controls Under
Uncertainty, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 229 (1978) (extending Weitzman model to incorporate
distortions in output); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21–35, 42–47 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing optimal pricing of
externalities).
128 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327–28 (1993).
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we might expect some tendency for detailed governance rules to be
associated with liability rules and prices.129  With a price, actors are in
equipoise with respect to costs; each actor must find where marginal
benefit equals marginal cost (including liability).  By contrast, cruder
signals (informational variables, proxies), which characterize delinea-
tion strategies—toward the exclusion end of the spectrum—tend to be
backed up with sanctions rather than prices.  Crude variables will
bunch a lot of attributes in an all-or-nothing way; monitoring for the
zero-level of attribute A is likely to be complementary to monitoring
for the zero-level of attribute B.  For example, in the case of a plot of
land one can monitor an actor’s location as being inside or outside a
fence and can thereby simultaneously ensure zero-level use of soil
nutrients, standing crops, the drainage properties of the soil, etc.  Situ-
ations in which a single measured variable picks out the optimal
amount of various uses—say fifty units of soil nutrients and twenty-
three square feet of surface area—are not as likely.130  If a user takes
both soil nutrients and surface area as inputs into his or her consump-
tion or production, then a rule that aims for nonzero-level of use
would either have to prescribe the optimal use of the two attributes at
once (perhaps by using two separate signals) or else there will be sub-
stitution and distortion among the uses.  Also, if the harm from using
the attributes changes over time but not in tandem, then the signals
employed will have to adjust to two changes.  This is difficult for the
precise variable in a system aiming at a nonzero-level.
But a rough signal aiming at a zero-level can be backed up by a
sanction, which will not need to be changed as the level of harm
changes.  Instead the owner can adjust among the uses; a single cen-
tral nervous system can engage in the substitutions and will face the
full costs and benefits.  Notice that if the owner seeks to capture any
gains from having different actors specialize in different, potentially
conflicting uses, the required contracting over these uses will entail
some delineation and evaluation of uses for enforcement of the con-
tract.  The contracting parties may on their own initiative come up
with new use-oriented signals to implement their contract.  And, as
parties close to the situation, they will often have an advantage in
devising new finely tailored signals for optimal use.  Consider a
grazing commons, in which rules of proper use include those allowing
129 Multipliers may be needed to adjust for less than certain detection of violations. See
supra note 124. R
130 Such situations are possible when the use of the attributes is likely to be in some
fixed proportion, but this requires knowledge of the use that involves fixed proportions.
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commoners to graze animals in proportion to their land holdings or to
how many could be kept over the winter.131
Put differently, the point of using access-based rather than use-
based rules in the first place is to avoid the need for officials to mea-
sure the full range of uses of the asset.  Access-based exclusion rules
do not require courts and other officials to separate out—or even
know about—uses in a way that would, however, be required in set-
ting up the actuarial classes and probability distributions upon which
the entire liability rule approach rests.  A taker who faces a liability
rule and a price can in effect force officials to make those measure-
ments that the access rule was chosen to avoid.  An access rule should
be chosen where further precision in officials’ measurement of activi-
ties is not cost-effective.  As I will argue, this is apt to happen where
use is difficult to measure in the sense that signals relating to use are
subject to deterioration.  And the more dimensions there are to mea-
sure, the more likely it is that signals will be subject to deterioration.
Thus, in situations where use is hard to measure in this way, liability
rules will be under- or overcompensatory, or accuracy will be achieved
at excessively high cost.
III
THE INFORMATION COST ADVANTAGES
OF PROPERTY RULES
Why are property rules so pervasive in the law?  This Part gives
several reasons for the law’s reliance on property rules that are rooted
in information costs and specialization in information production.
First, and most basically, I will show that for reasons of informa-
tion cost it is often advantageous and almost inevitable that rights will
be delineated by means of what I have called an “exclusion strategy.”
Such a strategy relies on rough and low-cost signals that are not tied to
use in order to protect indirectly a large and unspecified set of uses.
The boundary around a parcel of land is the classic example, as are the
physical contours of other things in personal property.  Because the
signals used in the exclusion strategy are on/off, they are naturally
131 See, e.g., W.O. AULT, OPEN-FIELD FARMING IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND:  A STUDY OF
VILLAGE BY-LAWS 123, 137, 141 (1972) (describing stinting of sheep); ROBERT MCC.
NETTING, BALANCING ON AN ALP:  ECOLOGICAL CHANGES AND CONTINUITY IN A SWISS
MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY 61 (1981) (“An important regulation of alp rights in 1517 laid
down the principle that ‘no one is permitted to send more cows to the alps than he can
winter.’”) (citation omitted); GLENN G. STEVENSON, COMMON PROPERTY ECONOMICS:  A
GENERAL THEORY AND LAND USE APPLICATIONS 215 (1991) (noting that, because
amount of grass consumed does not significantly increase if animals are left on field longer,
regulating number of animals fixes intensity of harvest in all but easily adjusted-to long
run).
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paired with property rules.  Thus, property rules gain favor as a result
of their association with the exclusion strategy, which has information-
cost advantages in a wide variety of very basic and especially imper-
sonal settings.  Contrary to the thrust of recent pro–liability rule com-
mentary, it is property rules rather than liability rules that truly
decentralize decisionmaking.  This decentralization has a variety of
advantages in terms of information cost and simplicity.
Second, I will show that this delegation through exclusion and
property rules has advantages in deterring opportunism by potential
takers.  Plausible and widely accepted assumptions about the relative
abilities of owners, takers, and officials to generate information about
assets—and, as I emphasize, assign them to actuarial classes—provide
a clear rationale for protecting owners with property rules.  Liability
rules, by contrast, either leave owners with too little protection for
investments in information, or such rules require supraoptimal infor-
mation gathering by officials.
Third, I likewise will show that viewing property rules as an
essential part of the delegation to owners through the exclusion
strategy allows us to extend arguments that property rules economize
on wasteful self-help measures by owners.  The delegation to owners
protected by law furnishes a reason to favor property rules even in the
face of the strong case that has been made for liability rules.
A. Property Rules and Exclusion in Property
The problems of uncertainty and possible owner self-help are
part of the reason why property rules protect different kinds of enti-
tlement than do liability rules.  The intuition that property rules are
particularly suited to the protection of things—and, unlike some, I
include here intangible things—is no accident.  Protection of a large
and indefinite class of uses by delineating a thing and giving the owner
a right to exclude others from the thing is a strategy well suited to
situations in which it is not economical to decide first-order questions
of use on a use-by-use basis.  Instead, the right to exclude from a
thing—property in the classic sense—is the result of a second-order
delegation to the owner to choose among any uses, known or
unknown, of the thing.  To be sure, refinement in high-stakes border-
line cases will be necessary, and liability rules have their place there,
as in the law of nuisance.132  But these refinements are just that; they
rest on a basic exclusionary system, backed up by property rules, that
avoids the cost of use-by-use delineation in the majority of situations.
132 For an argument that this role of liability rules in nuisance has often been overstated,
see Smith, supra note 4. R
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The bundle-of-use-rights approach pursued in the liability rule litera-
ture—even when issues of investment are the focus133—makes lia-
bility rules seem deceptively attractive.
1. Decentralization and Delegation to Owners
Property rules thus do preserve a “transaction structure,” but on
the theory offered here, that structure consists of a delegation to
owners of the function of gathering information about uses.  Tradi-
tionally, one of the purposes of property is to internalize the costs and
benefits of a wide range of uses of an asset on the owner.  The owner
then has an incentive to maximize the value of the asset, and, to the
extent that internalization has been successful, the owner’s maximiza-
tion of private value will at the same time maximize the social value of
the asset.134  Part of the function of owners is to be a broker between
the present and the future; if future values are capitalized into present
price or if owners can wait until their investments in assets accrue,
then a present owner makes choices that reflect future values as
well.135
Elsewhere I have argued that different strategies for delineating
property rights rely to varying degrees on this type of delegation to
owners.136  In an exclusion strategy, the law sets up rough signals
(informational variables, proxies) defining the boundaries of the asset.
Within this zone of protection, owners have the choice of how to
invest in or consume the asset.  For example, an owner has the right to
exclude from a column of space around a parcel of land as defined in
the ad coelum rule.137  Monitoring need only focus on the location of
other actors and objects, not on others’ activities with respect to the
resource, and certainly not on the value of such activities.  By contrast,
under a governance strategy, uses of assets are picked out and evalu-
ated.  For example, farmers with a right of access to a grazing com-
mons might be subject to time and manner restrictions, such as
133 See Bebchuk, supra note 97 (assessing effect of allocation of entitlements on R
investment).
134 For a classic statement, see generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (Papers & Proc. 1967).
135 Id. at 355.
136 See Smith, supra note 24, at S468–71; Smith, supra note 4 at 1018–40. R
137 The full statement of the maxim is cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos (he who owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths).  The maxim is
routinely followed in resolving issues about ownership of air rights, building encroach-
ments, overhanging tree limbs, mineral rights, and so forth, and is subject to certain limited
exceptions, such as for airplane overflights. See Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining
Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 26–35 (1985) (discussing airplane overflights and
other exceptions to ad coelum rule).
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requirements to keep animals tethered.138  Given an asset or resource
of a particular size, the exclusion and governance strategies just
described form two ends of a spectrum from very crude methods of
measurement that delegate to an owner control over a wide and indef-
inite class of uses to increasingly fine-grained types of delineation that
directly prescribe proper use.
Both the exclusion and governance strategies, and those in
between, are methods of internalizing costs, but, given an asset defini-
tion, they represent different approaches to the question of precision
and delegation.139  The exclusion strategy bunches together a lot of
uses and does not inquire into details; it lacks the benefits of precision
in terms of maximizing the value of individual uses, say from speciali-
zation by different actors in different uses of the same asset.  At the
same time, the exclusion strategy avoids the costs of precision.  By
contrast, governance captures the benefits of precision but at a higher
cost.  Governance deals directly with problems that are left to the
owner to handle under exclusion.  Thus, exclusion and governance
have characteristic and different cost (supply) curves.  Given a
resource, this simple model can be depicted as in Figure 1, with
W(ealth) on the y-axis and precision on the x-axis.140  Exclusion has
lower marginal cost (MCE) where the optimal level of precision is
low, but rapidly becomes high cost.  Using fences to modulate com-
plex questions of use—such as proper grazing technique or optimal
noise levels—would be prohibitively costly.  Governance, by contrast,
starts out with high marginal cost (MCG)—imagine regulating the
“use conflict” between the owner and all possible encroachers by a set
of spelled-out use rights—but becomes the lowest-cost method where
138 Smith, supra note 24, at S459–60, S480–81 (describing historical development of R
grazing rights through exclusion and governance models).  For a dramatic example of rising
pressure on grazing land leading to increasingly strict and detailed governance rules about
tethering in traditional Danish agriculture, see Karen J. Friedman, Fencing, Herding, and
Tethering in Denmark, from Open-Field Agriculture to Enclosure, 58 AGRIC. HIST. 584,
593–94 (1984).
139 In an insightful book review, William Powers makes the point that the law proceeds
in two “methodologically” very different ways, which he terms “ownership” and “reasona-
bleness.”  William C. Powers, Jr., A Methodological Perspective on the Duty to Act, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 523, 526–27 (1979) (reviewing MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT:  TORT
LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY (1977)).  His taxonomy is similar to that between what I
am calling exclusion and governance, but Powers does not analyze the distinction further in
terms of costs and benefits beyond noting the traditional justifications for ownership, such
as stability and incentives for investment. See id. at 527.
140 Precision can be operationalized in several related ways. See Smith, supra note 24, at R
S471–74.  Among these would be the quantity of information, in the Shannon-Weaver
sense, per unit of delineation cost?what I have elsewhere called information intensiveness.
See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:  Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1126–28 (2003).
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stakes are high enough to require precision in delineating uses.  The
“supply” of property rights is the envelope of the two curves, formed
by taking the lowest point on the individual supply curves:141






MCE = marginal cost of exclusion
MCG = marginal cost of governance
MB = marginal benfit of precision
Although it is largely beyond the scope of this Article, the model
depicted in Figure 1 can be used to predict how changes in asset value
will lead to greater or lesser reliance on exclusion or governance, and
these predictions have implications for property rule versus liability
rule protection.  Thus, as the marginal benefits of precision rise (as
with rising resource value) from MB to MB’, the model suggests that
there will be a greater reliance on governance rules to protect a given
asset.142  Whereas exclusion has the lowest marginal cost at p*, gov-
ernance has the advantage after the two supply curves cross, before
we reach p’*.  Because governance regimes have a greater tendency
than exclusion regimes to be associated with liability rules, we would
expect a tendency to adopt new liability rules as the stakes in partic-
141 In a more detailed model, there would be curves for a wide range of rule types
ranging along the spectrum from exclusion to governance, and the supply of property
rights would be the envelope of all these curves. See Smith, supra note 24, at S474–78. R
142 The qualification “given an asset definition” is necessary because the marginal bene-
fits can call forth effort at defining assets in a more fine-grained way?for example smaller
plots?thus moving towards a more fine-grained exclusion system.  For these details and
their implications, see Smith, supra note 24, at S475–77. R
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ular use conflicts become higher.143  The story of pollution control,
with the development of nuisance law and later environmental regula-
tion, broadly conforms to this picture.144  Conversely, when the stakes
in use conflicts fall, we expect, for any given asset, an eventual shift to
greater reliance on exclusion and property rules.  Sometimes the shift
between exclusion and governance according to conditions of scarcity
is built into the law itself.  Thus, in water law under riparianism, and
even many prior appropriation systems, complex evaluations of the
nature of use (natural versus artificial, etc.) come into play when—and
only as long as—water is unusually scarce.145
Recall from the earlier discussion of prices and sanctions, that the
information-cost theory leads one to expect that property rules will be
strongly associated with sanctions and that liability rules will be
weakly paired with prices.146  Consider what types of information
gathering will be complementary.  Property rules are used as part of
exclusionary regimes, and, as I argued, the signals for a zero-amount
of one use are likely to be strongly complementary to those for the
zero-level of another use:  Location on the other side of a fence will
ensure a zero-level of a large range of uses.  By contrast, if a govern-
ance regime already requires evaluation of individual uses, it may not
cost much more to gather the information about marginal harm or
individuals’ valuations (or their distributions) that liability rules
require.
Liability rules inevitably involve some need for an official to eval-
uate the uses of an asset.  At the very least, the distributions of values
that commentators typically assume are within officials’ knowledge
are based on the possible, and in particular the best, use that the
owner and the taker might make of the asset.  In this sense, despite
the “harnessing of private information,” liability rules delegate less to
owners and put more choice among uses in the hands of courts.
A legal regime that simply supplies an exclusion regime does not
foreclose all kinds of governance rules:  On the contrary, exclusion
also delegates to owners the decision of whether to contract for a gov-
143 These governance rules need not be supplied by the state.  Contracting and social
norms will become increasingly precise as stakes rise.
144 See Rose, supra note 23, at 8–36.  Rose argues that pollution control has moved from R
a pure “keep off” strategy based on exclusionary trespass-like norms, through a “right-
way” regime of regulations of proper use, to, more recently, the beginnings of a property
regime based on tradable permits.  The latter involves more fine-grained asset definition,
in my terms.  Smith, supra note 24, at S475–77. R
145 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (establishing hierarchy of riparian rights:
domestic, agricultural, manufacturing); Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (4 Scam.) 492, 495
(1842) (adopting system of riparian rights based on reasonable use).
146 See supra Part II.C.
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ernance regime.  An owner with the right to exclude is not required to
exclude others:  Where the law does not supply a governance regime,
owners and others can, transaction costs permitting, devise and imple-
ment a precise use-based regime over the assets in question—as where
developers or neighboring landowners subject a group of parcels to
interlocking real covenants.  Alternatively, neighbors can adopt norms
of proper use that are more informal than real covenants.147  If the law
itself involves a choice between an exclusion and a governance
regime, the exclusion regime is likely to involve less centralization,
because it delegates more choices to owners.
It might be objected that a property rule also involves a choice
between the plaintiff and the defendant.  But this misunderstands the
nature of property.  Much of the literature since Coase’s seminal
article on social cost assumes that resource disputes—and nuisance
suits in particular—involve a choice of who gets the entitlement as
between two parties whose uses reciprocally interfere with each
other.148  As Merrill and I have argued, this approach misses some-
thing essential about property:  It is a right to a “thing” good against
the world.149  Typically, things are defined in a rough exclusion-like
way, and this sends a simple message to the world to “keep off.”  Talk
of things reflects a choice to view a situation at least partly in terms of
exclusion—using the simple signals, often borrowed from our eve-
ryday knowledge, that set one thing apart from another.
The law does not spell out a list of use rights beforehand but
specifies an open-ended set of uses implicitly by giving the owner the
right to exclude others from the asset.  This idea that property speci-
fies a set of use rights implicitly and open-endedly has long roots
tracing back at least to Austin, who believed that “indefiniteness is of
the very essence of the right [of property]; and implies that the right
. . . cannot be determined by exact and positive circumscription.”150
147 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
148 Merrill & Smith, supra note 32, at 370–71, 378–79. R
149 Id. at 391–94.
150 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 827 (photo. reprint 1996) (Robert
Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1873); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 5 cmt. e, 10 cmt. c
(1936) (noting that totality of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities associated with
property ownership vary over time and that owner’s status does not change even if owner
parts with many of these rights); Bernard E. Jacob, The Law of Definite Elements:  Land in
Exceptional Packages, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1388 (1982) (discussing how Restatement
definition of complete ownership requires “not only reasonably exclusive present control,
but also an indefinite reservoir of potential uses”).  Another writer who comes close to
sharing this view is Savigny, who considered the hallmark of possession to be that it pro-
tected a right.  After noting that, in Roman law, possession “refers only to property and
jura in re,” he states that, “the whole right of Possession consists in the protection against
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When the realist, or bundle-of-rights, view treats property as a list or
bundle of use rights, it is leaving something fundamental out of the
picture.  Delineation does not proceed use by use.  As William
Markby analogized, ownership “is no more conceived as an aggregate
of distinct rights than a bucket of water is conceived as an aggregate of
separate drops.”151
The owner of a house can use it for cooking dinner or reading a
book, but these uses are not specified beforehand.  Trespass law and
much of nuisance law thus need not evaluate the uses that plaintiff
and defendant are proposing; many cases will be mechanically decided
on the basis of an invasion by defendant of plaintiff’s asset.152  There
is no need to balance uses and no need to specify them beforehand.
In some cases, the stakes will be high enough that it will be worth-
while to focus in on particular uses, and the rest of the law of nuisance
does function as a public governance regime.
Thus, posing the problem as a conflict between two discrete uses
already obscures much of the purpose of property.  Evaluating uses
can be thought of as a first-order problem of gathering and acting on
information about a resource.  Depending on the size of the parcels of
property, there will be a range of uses, the effects of which are inter-
nalized to the owner.  Property law delegates the choice among these
to the owner, without the need for the law to evaluate or even to
specify in advance what these uses are.  When a use falls squarely
within this implicitly defined set, the question is not evaluating use A
versus use B, but whether officials are well-placed to do this first-
order decisionmaking at all.  Instead, officials can enforce the law’s
second-order decision to delegate the first-order decision to the
owner.
And it is likely that when the law is being set up in the first place,
legislators or judges would be in a better position to make this second-
order decision about whether to delegate to owners than the first-
order decisions about assets themselves.  The exclusion strategy is low
cost at low levels of precision because it can give rough protection to a
wide range of uses about which officials need know little.  How rough
the total set of institutions surrounding the asset will be depends also
on the costs of contracting.  Overall, the question is between two
certain kinds of disturbance given to the mere exercise of the right, without any reference
to the existence of the right itself.” FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VON SAVIGNY’S
TREATISE ON POSSESSION 391 (Hyperion Press, Inc. 1979) (Erskine Perry trans., 6th ed.
1848).
151 WILLIAM MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 158 (6th ed. 1905).
152 For a further discussion of the use of exclusion as well as governance in the law of
nuisance, see generally Smith, supra note 4. R
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 43  3-NOV-04 14:56
November 2004] PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RULES 1761
modes of decisionmaking:  (i) a decentralized one based on the exclu-
sion strategy, in which the benefits of tailoring are not captured by the
law and may or may not be captured by contracting, and (ii) a central-
ized one based on an off-the-rack publicly provided governance
strategy, in which these benefits are captured but at greater delinea-
tion cost than in a more exclusion-based strategy.  If courts take the
realist view that each use conflict is an occasion to rethink the distri-
bution of sticks in the parties’ bundles, we are with the second mode.
But there is no a priori reason for mode (ii) to be more cost-effective
than mode (i).  And as a matter of empirical guesswork, the advan-
tages in mode (i) of not having to constantly delineate uses seem to be
large much of the time.
And so it comes as little surprise that the law makes widespread
use of the exclusion strategy.  At the time of a suit, the decision facing
a judge is whether it is better to stick to the original second-order
decision to delegate or to seize the first-order decision from the
owner(s) and decide it directly.153  The Coasean tradition as devel-
oped in the property rule/liability rule literature simply assumes that
courts are making first-order decisions without taking into account the
savings from decentralization and delegation made possible by tradi-
tional in rem rights to things—in other words, property.154
Thus, in a wide range of cases from falling rocks to building
encroachments, the only relevant question is whether the defendant
has invaded the column of space defined by the ad coelum rule.  The
plaintiff’s rights are measured by a signal based on spatial location.
Elaborate balancing of the utility of uses or distributions of private
values is not required.  As commentators have noticed, courts do not
require (or inquire into) reasonable behavior in suits in which land-
owners are tort victims, by contrast to the doctrines of contributory or
comparative negligence in accident law.  Landowners are generally
not required to take precautions against the wrongful acts or torts of
153 The governance strategy involves use of more information and will probably require
reliance on information that is hard to use.  In Ronald Heiner’s framework for decision-
making under uncertainty, where the first-order information becomes more difficult to use
(“distant” from the decisionmaker, in Heiner’s terms), we would expect a tendency to
avoid use of this information by moving towards the exclusion strategy. See, e.g., Ronald
A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 565–67 (1983).
154 It is probably no accident that law-and-economics scholars and liability rule propo-
nents are not generally in favor of compensation for reliance interests where laws have
retroactive effects.  If all decisions are first-order and involve the full range of possible
uses, a benevolent government has little reason to give compensation. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986).  Where
an owner’s reliance is part of a scheme of second-order delegation, the “new view” argu-
ments against compensation do not suffice.  I leave the detailed implications of the infor-
mation-cost theory for questions of retroactivity to further work.
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others.155  From the point of view of traditional law and economics,
this degree of absolutism in entitlements is deeply puzzling.156  In the
case of land, property rules are associated with an entitlement that
does not involve judicial evaluation of landowner choices.  Land is
both a resource subject to multiple uses and is also a very convenient
focal point for broadcasting duties to far-flung third parties (especially
to keep off).157  The second-order delegation is very strong.
Such delegations may seem inefficient in the context of the fore-
gone benefits in an individual case, but which approach is better in
general is an empirical question.  The first thing to notice about this
question is that at a stage prior to a lawsuit or to any of the primary
conduct leading to the dispute, the law often has already made a very
simple (second-order) decision to delegate the (first-order) choice
among a wide and indefinite set of uses to the owner.  This set of uses
was defined implicitly—through the ad coelum rule—because any use
that is protected though the vindication of the right to exclude is
implicitly included in the set of uses the owner controls.  At no stage
of the dispute does the law have to specify or evaluate these uses.
Now consider property rules.  When a court applies a property
rule, it vindicates only indirectly the plaintiff’s interests in any partic-
ular use.  For example, in trespass the set of uses implicitly swept in
under the ad coelum rule receives protection without the uses needing
to be specified or evaluated even at the remedy stage.  By contrast, a
liability rule requires some measure of damages that will compensate
the plaintiff.  At the least, this valuation requires one to know the
plaintiff’s value, or some fancier variant such as the owner’s average
value conditional on the taker’s actual value at the point where the
two are equal.  Even though this taking at an officially determined
“price” can substitute for a transaction and can harness private infor-
mation, it is a partial abandonment of the second-order decision to
155 See LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914).  Wood’s
treatise gives a classic formulation:
It is the duty of every person or public body to prevent a nuisance, and the fact
that the person injured could, but does not, prevent damages to his property
therefrom is no defense either to an action at law or in equity.  A party is not
bound to expend a dollar, or to do any act to secure for himself the exercise or
enjoyment of a legal right of which he is deprived by reason of the wrongful
acts of another.
1 H.G. WOOD, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances in Their Various
Forms § 435 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 3d ed. 1893).
156 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs:  Entitlement and
Efficiency in Tort Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 35–38 (1989); see also Mark F. Grady,
Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior:  Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 15 (1988).
157 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 32, at 393–94; Smith, supra note 4. R
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delegate first-order information gathering to parties.  Of course, on
the Coasean approach, we are asked to think always in terms of indi-
vidual uses anyway, and if so, the virtues of a second-order delegation
and the implicit delineation of use rights under the exclusion strategy
simply do not arise.
2. Delegation and the Timing of Valuation
Delegation to owners of information gathering is closely related
to the economics of the passage of time.  In the case of a decision
delegated to an owner of an asset, it may be cheaper to wait and see
how his bet on the future will pay off rather than settling up now, as
would be required under a liability rule.  An owner can be expected to
choose the set of uses of his asset that will afford him the highest of all
the alternative streams of income.158  The owner acts as a “broker”
who has an incentive to take into account the needs of the present and
the future.159  But it may take markets as well as courts some time to
catch on to the wisdom—or lack thereof—in the owner’s choice.  It
may be cheaper to wait and see.  Use C, chosen by the owner of the
asset, may have an optimal time in the future.  The current owner in
that case is making a bet on the future.  Courts will have the most
difficulty evaluating the competing evidence of owners and takers on
questions of valuation precisely where owners are at their most
entrepreneurial—finding opportunities for profit presented by
uncertainty.
Waiting and seeing under a property rule is a cheap method of
internalizing the benefits and costs to the owner.  Liability rules share
with market transactions the feature of settling up now, which
involves attaching public valuations to the asset.  The optimal time for
this determination may be in the future, but under a liability rule
regime, the taker can force a court to engage in the settling up and to
perform a public valuation at any time, even if the optimal time is in
the future.  By contrast, an owner whose entitlement to an asset is
protected by a property rule is in some sense also delegated the choice
158 Demsetz, supra note 134, at 355.  To what extent remote contingencies provide a R
reason for courts to be more interventionist ex post will depend on a variety of factors
including any psychological biases of transactors and courts. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith,
supra note 78, at 53 (discussing legal intervention to prevent fragmentation for future); R
Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights:  The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 546, 572–73 (1991) (documenting law’s seeming inconsistency in level of
contingency of various rights); Jay Weiser, The Real Estate Covenant as Commons:  Incom-
plete Contract Remedies Over Time, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 269 (2004) (analyzing fac-
tors including investment and changed circumstances as bearing on property rule versus
liability rule protection).
159 Demsetz, supra note 134, at 355. R
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of the best time to put a public, shared valuation on the asset.  The
benefits of getting this right and the costs of error are internalized to
the owner, in a way that they are not internalized to the taker (or to a
court) under a liability regime.
3. Manipulation and the Deterioration of Liability Signals
Exclusion and governance are also different strategies for solving
the problems of parties’ adjustment of the behavior to courts’ rules
and the consequently greater need for courts to gather information.
Information gathering is indirect in the sense that various imperfect
signals will be used that correlate more or less closely with the valued
attributes of the asset.  Because parties control the asset and their
actions, they may manipulate these signals to their advantage.
As a result of such manipulation, various signals may be subject
to deterioration but not equally so.  A classic hypothetical example is
the redness of apples.160  Consider a situation in which redness ini-
tially correlates strongly with tastiness.  Consumers (usually) cannot
taste the apples in the store and so must rely on more indirect tests
like color, which is an imperfect but low-cost signal for the attribute—
taste—in which they are interested.  Consumers will pay more for red
apples, because they expect to get better taste.  Growers and sellers in
turn have an incentive to increase the redness of apples, say by using a
certain chemical, even if it does not increase their tastiness.  Where
this manipulation increases redness enough to affect the price and
simply increasing the desired attribute (taste) would be more expen-
sive, apples will get redder but less tasty at every level of redness.  The
signal provided by color thus deteriorates in several respects.  First,
there is a problem of dynamic waste.  Consumers (users of the signal
or proxy variable) must expend resources to constantly update their
estimates of the correlation between redness and taste.  Or they must
abandon the color signal in favor of a less cost-effective one.  Second,
compression along the measured margin—here color—can reduce its
informational value.  In the example, if the use of the chemical
increases the redness of untasty apples more than that of already tasty
apples, the compression in the range of color means that the informa-
tional value of the signal is reduced.161
160 Barzel, supra note 11, at 42–46. R
161 Id. at 43.  This is similar to the real problem with “grade inflation.”  Because A (or
A+) is the highest possible grade, grades lose their informational value because they are
compressed at the upper end.  Pure grade inflation, where grades higher than A+ could be
added, would not lead to a lessening of information if all grades shifted upward in tandem
and users of the grades kept their information about the scale updated.
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Examples of the informational deterioration of signals abound.162
One example from the history of patent law is an invention for putting
flecks on tobacco leaves, which, when occurring naturally, are a signal
of high quality.163  Again, signals that do not deteriorate are better but
may not be available at reasonable cost.  The optimal amount of dete-
rioration may be positive, and the law would make a major contribu-
tion by facilitating the use of the most cost-effective set of signals over
time.
Property rules are common because of their use in the basic and
widespread—and stable—exclusion strategy.  The signals upon which
exclusion relies are typically less subject to deterioration than those
associated with more finely tailored governance rules.  Because the
exclusion approach implies the use of property rules, property rules
gain an advantage.  An exclusion regime can capture implicitly many
uses without separate delineation, but if these uses fall in the center of
a broad exclusionary right, they are also likely to be captured regard-
less of manipulative behavior by owners and takers.164  That property
is a right to a thing has important consequences for information cost;
the exclusion-type regime will tend to be less subject to manipulation.
As Emily Sherwin points out, “[t]he reason for the special respect
given to physical objects may be that the objects themselves provide
an excellent form of fixed rule.  The contours of an object . . . establish
a boundary that is highly resistant to revision in a particular dis-
pute.”165  In the case of land, by means of the ad coelum rule, trespass
law will easily and stably capture uses requiring presence on the land,
such as stealing crops.
162 Another familiar one is the effort of sellers of houses to make cosmetic changes to
houses they are selling. Id. at 45.  Even though buyers are aware of this practice, it sur-
vives and an individual seller would be worse off not engaging in it.
163 Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900) (finding tobacco-flecking invention
unpatentable for lack of utility since its only purpose was to deceive). But cf. Juicy Whip,
Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that patent for machine
dispensing premixed soda that gives appearance of mixing soda was valid).
164 Manipulation may cause more peripheral uses not to be captured.  For example, tres-
pass does not deal as well with conflicting uses by those on adjacent parcels or use by
people merely trying to look in.  Gary Washburn & Matt O’Connor, Cubs Hurl Federal
Suit at Rooftop Owners, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2002, at 1 (describing suit alleging misappro-
priation of baseball games); see also Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v. Sully’s Bar, Inc., 650 F.
Supp. 838 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that satellite TV system owner stated cause of action
for interference with contract, interference with advantageous business relations, and con-
version against tavern owners intercepting satellite signal and exhibiting programs to cus-
tomers, but holding conversion claim preempted by copyright).  On the debate over
whether exploratory trespass can occur from an adjacent parcel, see infra note 241. R
165 Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075,
1091 (1997).
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With governance, on the other hand, more fine-grained picking
out of uses means that more examples of the uses will be near the
edge of the signal, such that at low cost the use could be changed and
would no longer be associated with the signal.  For example, govern-
ance rules among those with access to a common fishery can be based
on the weight of fish caught, but the danger is that fishers will “high-
grade” by dumping smaller (but already dead) small fish out of a catch
to make room for larger fish that are more valuable per pound.166
Other governance rules based, for example, on restricting times for
fishing can lead to overcapitalization in larger boats and better equip-
ment in a race to make more individually effective but socially
wasteful use of permitted fishing times.167  Thus, governance regimes
have more delineation to police; this is one of the reasons why precise
rules, like those characteristic of governance regimes, have high costs.
If the benefits from delineation are high enough as well, then the
optimal degree of precision can be high enough that it becomes worth
policing governance-style signals or tolerating some deterioration (or
both).  But this will be reserved for special situations where the basic
exclusionary regime is not enough.
Because liability rules are typically not used for exclusion
regimes, the fact that potential deterioration makes exclusion cheap
for the most basic problems of property rights delineation is an addi-
tional argument for property rules.  Liability rules themselves presup-
pose a picking out of specific uses, and this in turn requires fine-
grained measurement.  If fine-grained signals tend to be more subject
166 See Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustain-
able Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 809 (1997) (describing highgrading); Carol M.
Rose, Expanding Choices for the Global Commons:  Comparing Newfangled Tradable
Allowance Schemes to Old-fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 45, 60 (1999) (noting that limits based on catch measured in pounds can
encourage destruction of low-value fish); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property:
Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129,
170–71 (1998) (same).
167 See, e.g., Frances R. Homans & James E. Wilen, A Model of Regulated Open Access
Resource Use, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 17 (1997) (“[R]egulated fisheries are likely
to attract even more redundant capital than was predicted by Gordon’s unregulated open
access model.”); Scott C. Matulich et al., Toward a More Complete Model of Individual
Transferable Fishing Quotas:  Implications of Incorporating the Processing Sector, 31 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 112, 120 (1996) (noting time limits for fishing lead to race to
process and overcapitalization); Anthony Scott, Development of Property in the Fishery, 5
MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 289, 296 (1988) (“[L]icense limitation without other reinforcing
measures induced such a sickening excess of investment in individual fishing capital, such
excessive preoccupation with racing and rivalry, and such costly dependence on public
enforcement that analysts were challenged to look for something else.”); see also Jonathan
H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion:  Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource
Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 16–17 (2004) (summarizing studies that con-
clude that fishing regulation leads to racing and overcapitalization).
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to deterioration, then potential deterioration is a reason to favor prop-
erty rules in the normal course.  This explains why property rules are
used in the most basic and widespread types of situations.
The advantage of property rules can also be cast in terms of
agency theory.  The problem of entitlement protection can be likened
to a multitask agency problem.  Recent literature has shown that
under a variety of circumstances, high-powered incentives may pro-
duce worse results than lower-powered ones.168  In our terms, liability
rules provide high-powered, finely-tailored incentives, but this may
not be optimal under certain conditions where owners and takers act
along various margins that are not all equally costly to measure.  For
reasons of information cost, property rules are used where a broad
and indefinite reservoir of uses is involved, and these property rules
will be associated with a sanction.
An analogy to income taxation is instructive.  Economists have
pointed out that one factor in the choice of optimal taxation rules is
that a broader tax base—in this case a definition of taxable income
that embraces more ways of becoming better off—will lead to a lower
elasticity of income.169  Put differently, where more welfare-increasing
activities are captured under the signals or “proxies” used to measure
income for tax purposes, there will be less incentive to adjust one’s
activity by shifting into nontaxed activities.  Lower elasticity of income
implies less distortion.  Similarly, in property, the use of exclusion
together with a property rule sweeps a broad class of uses into the
definition of the entitlement.  By contrast, the kind of individualized
use-by-use approach under liability rules can be expected to leave the
owner with a greater elasticity of use choice:  Owners who can antici-
pate systematically over- or undercompensatory liability awards will
be elastic in their choice of use and opt for different ones from those
they would choose when faced with a broader entitlement-defining
rule.
The taxation analogy can be carried further.  As in taxation,
owners and takers may anticipate the rule.170  Thus where uses do
168 For example, rewarding workers by output may lead them to abuse their machines
where part of the problem is to get them to maximize output along both the output and
machine wear dimensions.  Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent
Analyses:  Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24,
25 (Special Issue 1991).
169 See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & WOJCIECH KOPCZUK, THE OPTIMAL ELASTICITY OF
TAXABLE INCOME 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7922, 2000)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7922.
170 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860,
872–75 (1999) (discussing ability to anticipate application of rule and resultant opportunity
for arbitrage).
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need to be individually delineated and evaluated, the law often does
so through standards—which are vague ex ante, and only filled in ex
post—rather than through bright-line rules.171  The law of negligence
and parts of nuisance law are paradigm cases of the use of standards.
Broad, bright-line rules of trespass and narrower, more use-based
standards of nuisance are to be expected, and in such a world, prop-
erty rules have a major place.
4. Property Rules and the Numerus Clausus
The information-cost implications of property rights for third par-
ties also furnish a reason for limiting the kinds of liability rules the law
will allow.  The exclusion strategy has advantages in keeping rights
simple for third parties, which is a major consideration for property,
less so in torts and much less so in areas like contracts.  Property rights
are in rem—they avail against the “rest of the world”—and for this
reason these types of rights tend to be subject to mandatory limita-
tions, including the fixed and limited menu of basic property rights:
the numerus clausus (closed number) of property rights.172  Under the
numerus clausus, parties cannot create new idiosyncratic property
rights but must stick to the basic building blocks defined by the law.
The numerus clausus is a limitation on the types of rights, including
ways of dividing rights.
The choice between liability rules and property rules, and
between types of liability rules, is in part a choice among different
ways of dividing entitlements and how many different types of divided
entitlements there should be.  As Merrill and I have argued, this ques-
tion turns on information costs, in particular those incurred by third
parties.173  Information costs include the cost of producing and veri-
fying information about the scope and security of rights.174  In the case
of contracts, where the consequences of complexity and idiosyncrasy
171 See, e.g., id. at 875–77 (discussing how tax law can use standards in response to
abuses under rules).  On rules versus standards, see, for example, Louis Kaplow, Rules
versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 568–88 (1992).
172 Merrill & Smith, supra note 78, at 24–42. R
173 Id.
174 Information costs include but are not limited to verification costs, and the theory of
the numerus clausus sketched in the text and set out more fully in Merrill’s and my article
is based on a broad notion of notice and information cost (sometimes called measurement
cost). See id. at 30 n.117, 32–33, 43–51.  Hansmann and Kraakman propose a supposedly
different approach to the numerus clausus based on “verification,” without recognizing
that verification costs are a (proper) subset of the information costs upon which our theory
is based. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373
(2002); see also Smith, supra note 140, at 1125–26 (discussing types of information and R
information cost).
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are mostly of concern to the parties, we expect a low degree of inter-
vention to keep things simple and standardized.175  In the case of
property, the fact that the rights avail against the world and persist
over longer periods of time implies that a wide and indefinite group of
people, including potential violators and purchasers of rights, will
have to incur information costs in their encounters with property
rights.  Particularly in impersonal settings in which a large and indefi-
nite group will have to acquire and act on these types of rights, there is
a rationale for keeping them simple and standardized.  One method
for doing so is to subject them to a fixed and finite menu—a numerus
clausus of in rem rights.  If so, then in those settings in which in rem
rights are involved, we would expect a tendency to limit the number of
types of divided entitlements, including the number of ways of
delineating rights in the domain of transfer.
With property, then, we would not expect to allow every type of
liability rule that might be cost-justified before taking into account
third-party information costs.  Instead, we should expect a limited
number of rules, starting with the most useful.  As it stands, the law
allows property rules to protect basic rights, especially rights to
exclude.  Liability rules fine-tune this regime of property rules, in par-
ticular the conventional liability rule (Calabresi and Melamed’s “Rule
2”), under which, for example, a polluter can take the pollutee’s enti-
tlement to be free from pollution as long as the polluter pays the offi-
cially determined damages.176  But when it comes to in rem rights, the
law largely goes no further than having one type of liability rule to
modify the basic property rule protection, which is consistent with the
other liability rules—purchased injunctions,177 put-style rules,178 dual-
chooser rules, and higher-order liability rules179—being outside the
numerus clausus because the extra third-party information costs they
175 This is not to say we expect no standardization in the case of contracts.  Where the
third parties have reason to incur information costs in interpreting contracts, the law may
prescribe more formalistic modes of interpretation. See Smith, supra note 140, at 1177–90; R
see also Alan [nmi] Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Con-
tract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (arguing that formalistic contract interpretation is
advantageous to third parties, including those who might adopt parties’ contractual solu-
tions).  In general, the degree of intervention to keep down third-party information costs
slides along a spectrum according to how numerous and indefinite is the class of third
parties who will incur information costs. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 77, at 799–809. R
176 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116–22.  For more discussion of their four- R
way typology, see Smith, supra note 4, at 1007–09.
177 This is another term for Calabresi and Melamed’s famous Rule 4, which I take up in
greater detail in Smith, supra note 4, at 1007–21.
178 On how the law does not employ in rem put-style liability rules, see infra Part IV.B.
179 It is widely recognized that these more complex rules might entail higher administra-
tive costs than property rules or conventional liability rules, and would be a factor pushing
toward the adoption of simpler rules.  Ayres & Balkin, supra note 30, at 748; Ayres & R
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entail outweigh the frustration costs in not allowing them.  In this
regard, note that while the law certainly allows all sorts of options to
arise by contract, the law does not allow the creation of in rem rights
with customized liability rules or remedies.180
5. Exclusion, Property Rules, and Bounded Rationality
The association of property rules with the exclusion strategy may
reflect the limits of the human mind.  The exclusion strategy is a useful
shortcut for dealing with things that are the subject of resource
conflicts.
Before turning to the beneficial heuristic value of exclusion and
property rules, it is worth noting that the information cost theory sug-
gests a different way of interpreting the relevance of findings in
behavioral psychology to the question of legal remedies.  In a recent
paper, Rachlinski and Jourden ran an experiment in which they offer
subjects various hypotheticals:  Subjects are given an entitlement and
asked what they would sell it for, or they are not given an entitlement
and asked what they would spend to acquire it.181  The authors find
that entitlements protected by a property rule show the endowment
effect, under which subjects are willing to pay less for the entitlement
than they would have to be paid in order to give it up.182  They then
Goldbart, supra note 5, at 61.  The third-party information costs would tend strongly in the R
same direction.
180 It is true that the law allows contract rights, including options contracts, to be treated
as property for some purposes, coming under the heading “chose in action.”  When con-
tract rights are treated as property, however, the law does treat them in a highly standard-
ized way, as “things,” and seeks to drain as much personal information from them before
they can be treated as transferable choses in action. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note
78, at 54–55; J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. R
711, 802–03, 810–13 (1996).
181 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1559–66 (1998).
182 Id. at 1566–72.  On the endowment effect, see Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990)
(arguing that endowment effects persist even in market settings where participants have
opportunities to learn); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Anal-
ysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (discussing basics of endow-
ment effect); Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible
Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989) (reporting tests demonstrating
endowment effect); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice:
A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991) (presenting theoretical expla-
nation for endowment effect based on loss aversion).  For a sympathetic summary of work
in this area, see Richard H. Thaler et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, in THE WINNER’S CURSE:  PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE
63–78 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1992).  For one exchange on the robustness and the scope of
the endowment effect, see Jason F. Shogren et al., Resolving Differences in Willingness to
Pay and Willingness to Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 255 (1994) (finding, in contrast to pre-
vious studies, convergence between willingness to pay and willingness to accept for market
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conclude that the endowment effect is largely a barrier to negotiations
and that their study supports the emerging pro–liability rule consensus
in law and economics.183  There are two problems with this conclusion,
apart from its translatability to real situations of entitlement holding
and negotiation.  First, the pattern of answers in the study could
reflect subjects imagining developing subjective value in the entitle-
ment if given property rule protection.  Subjective value is not always
a barrier to negotiation that ought to be overcome; in some situations,
it ought to be accommodated.184  Second, in the case of liability rules,
subjects’ willingness to sell may stem from the fact that they perceive
themselves to have less leverage.  Indeed, these problems affect
Rachlinski and Jourden’s interpretation of Boomer,185 on which they
conclude (from the fact that the resident-plaintiffs did not appeal the
size of the damage award or ask for higher-than-market damages) that
the endowment effect caused them to focus on an injunction.186  A
more mundane but likely reason is that, in the absence of (extremely
rare) statutory directives, courts do not give damages higher than
market value in these settings and, as a result, there is little point in
asking for them.187
Instead, the delegation to owners through the exclusion strategy
emphasizes different consequences of bounded rationality.  If ration-
ality is bounded, then the choice of who should gather and act on first-
order information about assets matters, and the choice between first-
goods with close substitutes but persistence of divergence for nonmarket goods with imper-
fect substitutes); Gwendolyn C. Morrison, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and
Willingness to Accept:  Comment, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 236 (1997) (arguing that Shogren et
al.’s results are insufficient to reject endowment effect); Jason F. Shogren & Dermot J.
Hayes, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept:  Reply, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1997) (defending conclusions of earlier study and describing addi-
tional study).
183 Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 181, at 1574–76. R
184 Rachlinski and Jourden do assert that sometimes the endowment effect should be
accommodated, but they do not give a criterion for deciding when the endowment effect is
deserving of accommodation. Id. at 1576; see also Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs
of Legal Rules:  Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV.
361, 387–91 (1991) (discussing how possibility of endowment effect can render efficiency
analysis indeterminate).
185 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
186 Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 181, at 1543–44. R
187 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at
637–40 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing types of damages available to nuisance plaintiffs,
including diminution in market value and, under some circumstances, special damages, but
not damages for subjective value); see also Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 874–75 (discussing dam-
ages available and referring to diminution in objective value).  The liability rule literature
has focused on the mill acts with 150% damages as a possible example of damages for
subjective value, but this example is open to other interpretations. See supra notes 54–58 R
and accompanying text.
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order and second-order decisions (choosing the chooser) may be very
large.  Further, some models of bounded rationality suggest, both the-
oretically and experimentally, that decisionmaking under uncertainty
can sometimes be both easier and more accurate when information is
ignored, especially if that information in its content or form is unfa-
miliar to the potential user—i.e., it is “nonlocal.”188  Although I leave
the implications of this observation for further work, the information-
cost theory here suggests that the exclusion strategy is the type of
“fast and frugal heuristic” that allows boundedly rational beings to
make surprisingly accurate decisions in a low cost way.  The use of
signals like boundary crossings as an indirect signal for a large and
indefinite class of uses bears a strong resemblance to the successful
heuristics that psychologists have identified as lying behind human
decisionmaking.
6. Information Costs and Justifications for Property
Finally, the information-cost theory of property rules ties in with
another set of traditional views about property.  Many, especially
those with a libertarian orientation, have argued that property affords
a sphere of liberty protected from intrusion by others, including the
government.189  Property rules reinforce this sphere of liberty
because, as I have argued, they do not require an inquiry by courts
into the uses that owners have in mind for their assets.  And property
rules discourage takers from intrusive investigation into these uses as
well.  If some of the activities that the owner can undertake while pro-
tected by a property rule have high value that is not quantifiable, it is
not clear that an average-harm liability rule would work.  On the lib-
188 See, e.g., Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, The Recognition Heuristic:  How
Ignorance Makes Us Smart, in GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT
MAKE US SMART 37, 37–38 (1999); Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law:
On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986); Heiner,
supra note 153, at 565–68. R
189 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 139–42, 238 (1998) (dis-
cussing benefits flowing from sphere of autonomy secured by property rights); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7–21 (1962) (arguing that economic arrangements
based on capitalism and private property are necessary conditions for free society);
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149–231 (1974) (sketching historical
entitlement theory based on principles of justice in original acquisition of holdings, of
transfer of holdings, and of rectification of injustice in holdings); RICHARD PIPES, PROP-
ERTY AND FREEDOM 118–20 (1999) (arguing for close historical relationship between pri-
vate property and notions of freedom). But see, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY 289–322 (1988) (discussing relationship between private property and
various types of liberty); G.A. Cohen, Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain:  How Patterns
Preserve Liberty, 11 ERKENNTNIS 5, 21 (1977) (arguing that Nozick’s libertarian capitalism
“sacrifices liberty to capitalism”).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 55  3-NOV-04 14:56
November 2004] PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RULES 1773
ertarian view, the court’s measurement is prohibitively expensive, and
scrutiny itself could be damaging.
Property rules and sanctions protect the system of the delegation
of information production.  Calabresi and Melamed concluded that
property rule protection is appropriate to deter theft because it pro-
tects against actors’ attempts to convert property rules into liability
rules,190 but they did not explain why this is bad and many have puz-
zled over this question since.191  Some have suggested that the
problem is reciprocal takings or an asset’s common value to taker and
owner,192 but, on these accounts, it is still not clear why properly set
liability rules, in particular those with damages higher than under cur-
rent law or under Kaplow and Shavell’s average-harm approach,
cannot be used to deter takings.193  On the theory here, property rules
and sanctions make sense as devices to protect against takers unilater-
ally forcing officials to perform this first-order information produc-
tion.  The need to protect the delegation of first-order information
production to owners helps explain the intuition that liability rules are
vulnerable to attempts to “game the system” where thin markets
render difficult a court’s estimation of what the current owner of an
asset would receive in a hypothetical voluntary exchange.194  And this
approach dovetails with the point that liability rules do not protect
exchange value; if a taker need only pay for the value of the entitle-
ment-holder’s current use, then the taker enjoys any extra exchange
value, based on any other more valued use that might have become
clear later.195  In theory, courts could try to measure this value, but
then we return to the problem of first-order information production.
190 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1125–26. R
191 For a discussion of this large body of literature, see David D. Haddock et al., An
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2–9
(1990).
192 Kaplow and Shavell base their account of why property rules are used to deter the
taking of physical assets on these considerations.  Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at R
757–73.  But since Kaplow and Shavell do not base their account on measurement costs,
they cannot explain why property rules would be superior to liability rules based on some-
thing other than the average harm rules on which they concentrate.  For example, Kaplow
and Shavell note that a liability rule could provide for damages equal to the highest
common value and the mean idiosyncratic value. Id. at 762 n.157.  Although they note that
damages would typically be high enough to approximate property rule protection (and
would forgo many of the benefits in terms of takings under liability rules), id., again the
measurement required in the two cases would be quite different.  Measurement by proxy
leading to a rule of access avoids the need to measure uncertain and multidimensional uses
making up common value and average idiosyncratic value.
193 Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 3, at 149–50. R
194 Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach:
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 154–55 (1999).
195 Haddock et al., supra note 191, at 16–17. R
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In such situations, officials will often find it cost-effective to rely on
access-based rules of exclusion and so will need to use property rules
and sanctions to protect that second-order choice.
B. The Avoidance of Opportunism
This delegation to owners with property rules also has advantages
where takers can exploit opportunities to engage in strategic behavior
afforded by the uncertainty in identifying and evaluating uses of
things.  Owners, takers, and officials all engage in producing informa-
tion about assets or activities in order to determine expected value.
Owners invest in producing information about their assets in order to
maximize their return.  Takers invest in producing information about
other people’s assets in order to capture value by maximizing the
return from acts of taking.  And officials will evaluate assets and activ-
ities ex post in order to determine damages.  Each of these actors has
an information-production function.  Information production includes
evaluation of direct evidence about the value of an asset, as well as
more indirect evidence such as the actions and statements of owners
and takers.  Problems with liability rules emerge where owners have
an information-cost advantage over takers, but takers in turn have an
information-cost advantage over officials.  Under a broad range of cir-
cumstances, owners will be systematically undercompensated and will
invest less in their assets, causing property rules to be preferable to
liability rules.
Consider an asset with uses A and B.  One can view the asset as a
collection of valued attributes.196  Different uses of the asset will typi-
cally consume different proportions of the attributes of the asset.
What counts as an economically significant attribute depends on the
uses to which the asset is or might be put.  Thus, soil nutrients are an
attribute of a plot of land because grain, pasturage, or trees—all of
which are valued—might grow there.  Use A will draw on one bundle
of attributes, and use B will draw on a different but possibly overlap-
ping bundle of attributes.  Conflict over the use of the asset arises
196 See, e.g., Barzel, supra note 11; Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics R
of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497, 500–16 (1983) (discussing valued attributes of
diamonds as basis for buyer-oversearch problem and marketing practices to reduce it); see
also, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 155–56 (3d ed. 1984)
(describing theory of consumption based on consumer satisfaction through asset attrib-
utes); Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132,
133–35 (1966) (setting forth approach to consumer theory based on goods being collections
of multiple valued characteristics); Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets:
Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34, 34–36 (1974) (intro-
ducing approach to discovering implicit prices of valued characteristics of multi-attribute
products).
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because use A interferes with use B and vice versa.  Use A of the asset
will consume attributes essential to use B or otherwise make them
inaccessible to use B.  For example, growing corn will draw (consump-
tively) on many of the same attributes (space, soil nutrients, water) as
would growing hay or grazing animals, leading to use conflict.
Growing corn would also conflict with many nonagricultural uses of
the land such as operating a parking lot:  A concrete parking lot with
cars makes soil nutrients unavailable for growing corn (and vice
versa).
In the multiple-attributes framework, the problem of allocative
efficiency involves producing information about the costs and benefits
of actual and potential uses of assets (including human capital).  But
not all uses of an asset are equally easy to assess.  Say use A is easier
to assess than use B; perhaps there is even a market price for the asset
based on use A or a price for the products of use A, such that we can
simply consult a relevant price to evaluate use A.  Is this assessment
or price the only information about the asset that is relevant to alloca-
tion?  This depends on knowledge about alternative conflicting uses of
the asset.  There are several cases.  First, A might be the only possible
use of the asset, in which case an assessment of use A is effectively an
assessment of the asset.  To the extent that use A is monetizable, the
value of the asset is simply the discounted stream of actual or hypo-
thetical payments arising out of use A.  Second, A might be the only
known use of the asset, but there is another use B that has not been
discovered yet.  Third, there is another use B that has been discovered
but the discovery cannot yet be credibly communicated to others at a
reasonable cost.  Fourth, there is another use B that is known and can
be communicated but use B is more costly to assess than use A.  Fifth,
use A and use B are both known and equally susceptible to
assessment.
Consider the situation in which the owner of the asset knows of
use B but use B is unknown to courts and not easy to prove—its ver-
ifiability is relatively low.  In the most extreme case, use B is the result
of discovery information by its current owner.  While A was the only
use known by anyone, there was homogeneity in that type of asset.
But with use B, this homogeneity may no longer hold:  Some assets
grouped into the asset type may be suitable for use B but some may
not, thus destroying the homogeneity of the asset class.  Or, less dra-
matically, examples of the asset type may vary in the proportions of
attributes relevant for uses A and B, or may be otherwise more suit-
able for one use or the other than other members of the original asset
type.
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Someone who invests in information that increases the value of
an asset faces the problem of how to protect that information.  One
way to protect such an investment in information is to own the asset.
Let Owner (O) be the first person to think of use B.  If Taker (T)
takes the asset, the average-damages rule will give damages equal to
the average damage to current owners.  The “type” used in the rule
here embraces assets defined by the known uses; this may include
information about current owners.  The other owners of the asset type
do not value the asset for use B and, indeed, some of their assets may
not be suitable for use B.  Ideally, we would want to define asset type
differently once O has discovered use B.  The question is who will be
able to perceive the new asset type and at what cost.  This is an impor-
tant question because if officials treat O’s asset as belonging to the
original type, the average value will be undercompensatory to O, and
O will not have the incentive to develop the information in the first
place.197
One great difficulty in assessing the optimality of entitlement pro-
tection is that we would need to know the optimal level of investment
in information by owners in assets.  The paradox is that one reason to
favor property rules is to avoid having to know this, by simply dele-
gating the decision to owners.  What we need to decide on is the gen-
eral rule that works in the long run.
A court with unlimited resources would figure out both what uses
would be discovered with an optimal amount of resources and the
level of harm to new use B once equilibrium is reached at various
levels of liability, and would pick the level of liability reflecting the
most cost-effective value creation.  Various levels of liability that are
too low will result in a situation that is without use B or that is moving
slowly or in a costly (self-help) manner towards a new equilibrium.  In
addition, the necessary comparison is between the costs of self-help
and the costs of the property rule.  The level of liability will lead to
equilibrium at various levels, all of which look optimal if the amount
of information about uses is taken as fixed.
A further problem with the liability approach stems from its
notion of value.  Market prices make judicially determined damages
easier to calculate, but they also usually indicate that a market trans-
action would be cheaper than official determination of a price in an
197 One might ask whether the problem would disappear if this average includes
Owner’s (O’s) valuation.  This scenario would only arise where courts knew that some use
like B had been discovered but could not, at least for now, identify, even with the parties’
help, which assets are susceptible of use B.  Even in this semi-optimistic scenario, the
average-damages rule would be undercompensatory to someone, like O, with an asset that
in fact is valuable in use B.
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involuntary transaction.  But there is a deeper problem with the lia-
bility rule literature’s approach to price.  If the reason for there not
being a price that reflects the parties’ valuations is that there is no
general equilibrium in the market, then evaluations of the parties’
opportunity costs become problematic.198  One of the problems with a
static view of liability rules is that these rules can look optimal even in
a situation in which cost-effective investments in information about
uses are not being made.  The liability rule will look efficient even
where a higher level of liability (or even a property rule) would cost-
effectively call forth more such effort.
Actually, courts will not engage in this type of inquiry about uses
that would be discovered under alternative liability regimes.  Instead,
the court will delegate the information-gathering function to the par-
ties.  In the conventional liability rule literature, the values of the par-
ties are taken as given, as drawn from a fixed distribution.199  But
these values depend in part on the choice of rule that protects the
entitlement.  It is not only the case that the greater protection of the
property rules is worth something given an actor’s plan for the asset,
but that the actor will have more of an incentive to invest in enhancing
the asset, including developing information about it, if his entitlement
to that asset is protected by a property rule.  In a sense the law reflects
a choice of chooser.200  I will argue that property rules in general do a
better job of delegating the information-gathering function, even
though delegation and information harnessing are among the primary
arguments advanced for liability rules.  To foreshadow, property rules
serve the delegation function better when what is being delegated is
the production of information about the asset.  Courts are better at
dealing at one remove—in producing information about information
198 See, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo, Uncertainty, Subjectivity, and the Economic Analysis of
Law, in TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 71, 79–81 (Mario J. Rizzo ed., 1979);
Dieter Schmidtchen, Time, Uncertainty, and Subjectivism:  Giving More Body to Law and
Economics, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61, 72–74 (1993); see also Martin Shubik, The Gen-
eral Equilibrium Model Is Incomplete and Not Adequate for the Reconciliation of Micro
and Macroeconomic Theory, 28 KYKLOS 545, 558 (1975) (“In equilibrium (when plans do
match) the rules and the mechanism provided by the financial infrastructure apparently
vanish in that they are not then needed.  However they remain present to provide the
control system required when equilibrium is not present.”).
199 See, e.g., Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 5, at 20–21, 23; Brooks, supra note 6, at R
284–85; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 725–28, 776. R
200 Guido Calabresi’s proposal for placing liability on the cheapest cost avoider involves
a more limited delegation, in that it focuses on a preselected activity or class of activities
(such as driving or polluting), about which courts will need to develop information. See
CALABRESI, supra note 117, at 136–73; see also Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, R
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057–58 (1972).  Elsewhere I
argue that the type of informational “delegation” is one basic feature that differentiates
between property and tort. See Smith, supra note 4. R
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production rather than directly producing the first-order information
itself.  Courts need not know the details of each individual case, but
one has to be able to make empirical judgments that will support rules
of thumb.
At this point one might ask whether the answer to undercompen-
satory liability rules is simply to add some kind of extra liability to
make up for estimated error.  The problem here is not error per se but
the type of bias that is introduced when both parties are better at pro-
ducing information about the asset than is the court.  There are dan-
gers of overcompensation as well as undercompensation.201  An
overcompensatory liability rule might encourage original owners to
game the system.  This might happen if courts were overly credulous
of owners’ claims to have discovered uses of their assets.  A taker who
takes an “ordinary” member of the asset class would then have to pay
too much for the asset.202
Courts can wind up over- or undercompensating speculating
owners.  For example, if allocation and distribution are decoupled,203
the problem is that the reward to the current owner still has to be
determined, which involves measuring the value of O’s information.
The point of speculation is that someone who specializes in discov-
ering and evaluating attributes of assets will have the benefits and
costs of that information production concentrated on himself.  Court-
imposed liability will require some type of information production, if
only about the “relevant” class over which a probability distribution
of harm can be developed.  All modern liability rule approaches
require courts to know enough about the relevant probability distribu-
tion to be able to establish an unbiased mean expected value, and the
existence of a relevant “class” of assets over which this inquiry takes
place implies some information about the likelihood and value of
potential uses.  In Ayres and Goldbart’s words, their “dual-chooser
rules represent a kind of centralized planning writ small,” and in par-
201 There are dangers of owners and takers manipulating the rules to their benefit.
Thus, assuming a tort has happened and a tort plaintiff can anticipate a court’s overestima-
tion of damages, a court will have to adjust downwards. See Eric Rasmusen, Predictable
and Unpredictable Error in Tort Awards:  The Effect of Plaintiff Self-Selection and Sig-
naling, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 323 (1995) (modeling effect of plaintiff’s overestimation
on courts’ damage awards).  In the context of liability rules protecting property, the poten-
tial defendant also has the choice of whether and from whom to take, leading to similar
problems even though the taker would likely be the defendant.
202 “Put” rules under which the original owner could force a sale on another party could
lead to overcompensation and excessive development of assets to match whatever criteria
the courts are using.  On the absence of in rem put-style liability rules, see infra Part IV.B.
203 See Avraham, supra note 5; Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 5. R
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ticular resemble socialism with prices.204  The problem is the incentive
for coming up with the correct price.  Unbiased estimates are not
enough where asset classes are not internally homogeneous and are
endogenous to the rule.
For a given asset with multiple, valued attributes the asset’s value
may be not just risky but uncertain.  This uncertainty can be reduced
by producing information about the asset, placing it in a class of sim-
ilar assets, and then calculating the average value of that class.  This
function converts uncertainty into risk; by incurring information cost,
additional valuable information about assets is obtained.205  This is
reflected in the greater accuracy of the average; there is less variance
of the individuals from this average.  If fruit is grouped for pricing
according to taste, one could break the group into smaller and smaller
subgroups, with individual fruit pricing at the limit.  It might well be
the case that the overall average for the large group of fruit was
indeed the right average, but the distance of individual pieces of fruit
from this average will tempt consumers to engage in costly picking
and choosing.206  By using the average, income has been left in the
204 Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 5, at 10.  The comparison to central planning is R
instructive.  The liability rule literature has much of the flavor of socialism with prices, in
which central planners would use the best available information to determine and publish
prices that would govern the workings of state-owned enterprise. See, e.g., H.D.
DICKINSON, ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM (1939); OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM (Benjamin E. Lippincott ed., 1939).  Members of
the Austrian School countered that neither central officials nor any one human mind could
collect and act on the dispersed information that markets harness. See F.A. Hayek, The
Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945); F.A. v. Hayek, Socialist Cal-
culation:  The Competitive ‘Solution,’ 7 ECONOMICA (New Series) 125 (1940).  Other
Austrian economists argued that, without private property, central planners did not have
the incentives to come up with correct prices. See LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM:  AN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 137–42 (J. Kahane trans., Yale Univ. Press rev.
ed. 1951) (1922).  For an introduction to the vast literature on the socialist calculation
debate, see generally DON LAVOIE, RIVALRY AND CENTRAL PLANNING:  THE SOCIALIST
CALCULATION DEBATE RECONSIDERED (1985); Robert Heilbroner, Analysis and Vision in
the History of Monetary Economic Thought, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1097 (1990); Peter
Lewin, The Firm, Money, and Economic Calculation:  Considering the Institutional Nexus
of Market Production, 57 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 499 (1998).  Interestingly, before the events
of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the pro-socialist-calculation commentators were generally
considered to have the superior analytical case, based on the mainstream Walrasian style of
economics. See, e.g., Heilbroner, supra, at 1098 (acknowledging that capitalism ultimately
won in real world but that “the successes of the farsighted seem accounted for more by
their prescient ‘visions’ than by their superior analysis”).
205 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. R
206 On wasteful consumer efforts at picking and choosing, see Barzel, supra note 11, at R
28–32.
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public domain.  The more fine-grained fruit groupings will afford
smaller opportunities for capturing value by picking and choosing.207
The problem with liability rules is that they function like the price
for the fruit in a large bin.  If takers are better at measuring than
courts, then courts will optimally sort assets into coarser categories
than will takers.  Once the average is used for damages, takers can
then incur information cost in order to pick a more fine-grained subset
for taking whose members have an average value that is higher than
the one determined by the court.  Not only is this picking and
choosing nonproductive if it duplicates what the original owner has
done, but it leads to systematic bias in the damage level in the court’s
liability rule.
The reason that liability rules seem to work so well on the con-
ventional pro-liability analysis is that the background categories that
assets fall into are taken as given.  Basically, takers and courts draw
from the same distribution.  Besides this, Kaplow and Shavell assume
that the average is not systematically biased and harm-prevention
costs are not correlated with harm; if so, the ability of courts to get the
average right is as good over the long haul as getting things right every
time.208  Actors will face the correct incentives on an expected basis,
which cannot be improved upon.  This may work in some contexts
where one does not select victims in any more fine-grained way.  For
example, reckless drivers and polluters may be considered unable to
know more about victim harm than is reflected in the average-harm
liability rule, although this is an empirical question.209  This assump-
tion only works, however, as long as “average” means the average in
both the context of official determinations of value and takers’ and
owners’ determinations.
The average expected harm rule works best where activities and
assets do not vary and are not endogenous to the rule.  Thus, if an
injurer does not know whom he will injure and hidden variations in
the activity will not lead to a different average expected harm, then
the expected harm will match expected liability in a stable way.  But
problems emerge where activities that seem to be in the same actua-
rial class really differ, but appear to be the same to a court using
207 In a consensual setting, other devices can be used to reduce wasteful picking and
choosing.  For example, an opaque bag for fruit sold by a seller with a good reputation
might eliminate such opportunities altogether. Id.
208 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 725–27. R
209 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 17, at 313–14. But cf. Stephen McG. Bundy, Valuing R
Accuracy?Filling Out the Framework:  Comment on Kaplow (2), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 411,
421–22 (1994) (arguing that systematic bias can lead tortfeasors to take into account addi-
tional features of victims like race).
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cruder informational signals.  This will lead to systematic bias in the
court’s estimate of average harm.  Kaplow and Shavell assume that
precaution cost is independent of harm caused by an externality, and
this makes sense if activities are rigid (in terms of overall activity level
and precaution cost),210 but the multiple-attributes framework points
to a wide range of circumstances in which takers can gather informa-
tion and alter their activities to capture value left unprotected by a
liability rule.
Property rules are most called for where an entrepreneurial
owner, broadly defined, is good at gathering information cost-effec-
tively but results are not verifiable (entrepreneur makes bets), but a
potential taker is good at informationally free-riding on the entrepre-
neur.  Furthermore, the taker is better at doing this than courts.  This
scenario supports both an analytical and a rough empirical argument.
Analytically, if it can be shown that property rules are superior in any
situation, the most general case for liability rules is thereby rebutted.
But, as an empirical guess, the notion that owners are usually in a
better position to develop information about and increase the value of
assets than are takers, and that parties have better information than
courts, are standard ones in both the pro–liability rule literature and
in traditional property theory.211  The potential taker will be able to
pick out a class of assets that has a higher mean value than the one
that the courts have identified, and courts cannot cost-effectively keep
up.
The problem with liability rules is a simple one of opportunism in
the face of uncertainty.  Returning to the scenario of O and T, con-
sider now a case in which O has an asset that has uses A and B, which
are generally known, and a use C that is foreseen by O.  Benefits from
the asset are $10 for use A, $20 for use B, and $30 for C. O discovers
use C at a cost of $6, leading to a net gain of $4 for the discovery.212
At a cost of $2, T can develop the information that on average assets
of this type held by people like O are not worth the usual $20, but $25.
210 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 727 n.43, 772, 777–78. R
211 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 5, at 1083–86 (noting tradeoff between informa- R
tion-forcing advantages of liability rules and incentives to invest by owners); Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 5, at 768–69 (discussing owners’ special potential to increase value of R
assets); Merrill & Smith, supra note 32, at 360–66 (discussing and quoting expressions of R
concern for investment among traditional theorists).  On parties’ informational advantage
over courts, see, for example, Ayres & Talley, supra note 5, at 1030 (making assumption of R
superior private information), and Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 725 (assuming R
state’s information is imperfect). See also Schwartz, supra note 25, at 273–74, 279–80 R
(noting that courts systematically tend to know less than litigants about facts of disputes).
212 Benefit of C over B is $30 - $20 = $10; net benefit minus cost is $10 - $6 = $4.
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Notice that for T, in her valuation of the asset, features of O or
his activities become relevant.  As we will see, this type of personal
information about another actor is typically quite relevant in contract
but is studiously suppressed in property.  Indeed one of the functions
of property, as opposed to contract, is precisely to make rights easy to
process by third parties (like potential violators and courts) by sup-
pressing a great deal of information “internal” to the property,
including the identity and other features of the owner.213  Dutyholders
need to know just to “keep off” and do not need to know much else.
Liability rules are inconsistent with this tendency toward information
suppression in property.  But, for now, we are considering whether in
the situations in which liability rules or property rules might be used
to shape the behavior of potential takers like T, this suppression of
information is a good idea in the first place.  Even if property rules
will turn out to be closely related to the traditional notion of property,
we need to consider here whether something like the familiar institu-
tions of property should regulate the relation of T and O.  To return
to the example, provided that T can capture the return from the pro-
duction of information (as she can under the liability rule but not the
property rule), T can cost-effectively segment the class of owner-asset
pairs until the average value for the class that this particular asset falls
into is $25.
The third actor, the judge (or jury or administrative official), is
faced with the asset, the parties O and T, and their behavior.  If the
court can cost-effectively segment the set of triplets of owners, takers,
and assets only until the class containing this particular triplet has an
asset valued at $22, then the taking will occur (T gets an asset worth
$25 to her by incurring $2 in information costs and $22 in liability rule
damages, for a profit of $1), and O will be undercompensated by $8
($30 - $22). O has an overall loss of $4 and will not invest in the
information.214
In the example above, under the liability rule, T gains $1 (say
from selling back to O or someone like him or waiting until the condi-
tions change and make obvious the bet O made), but T’s $2 informa-
tion cost alone leads to a net societal loss even if the taking occurred.
But if O fails to invest in the first place, the loss here is at least $4.
The crucial question is how a court’s cost of segmenting classes of trip-
213 See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 29–30, 71 (1997); Merrill &
Smith, supra note 77, at 794–95; Merrill & Smith, supra note 32, at 359; Smith, supra note R
24, at S475; Smith, supra note 140, at 1151. R
214 O spends $20 to acquire the asset (the price being based on the highest widely
known use, B), spends $6 developing the information about use C, and receives $22 in
damages, for an overall loss of $4 ($22 – $20 – $6 = –$4).
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lets compares to other costs of securing this benefit.  The court’s cost
could include hiring government experts, etc.
Property rules reflect a decentralized solution to this problem.
The example assumed that the court’s marginal cost would equal mar-
ginal benefit where the apparent asset price of O’s asset is $22, $8
short of the mark.  Property rules can be superior to liability rules if
courts have a systematic disadvantage to parties in information gath-
ering that leads to these problems of opportunism in the face of
uncertainty.
Contrast this approach to that of Kaplow and Shavell.  They
assume that asset classes are known or at least can be cost-effectively
determined.215  (Recall that I am using a broad notion of asset not tied
to tangibility but rather one that at least includes all the “things” that
are protected by the exclusion strategy.)  Actually they assume that
asset classes are in effect the same for owners, takers, and courts.216
This is a special case in which all uncertainty is costlessly turned into
risk.  Once this is so, O loses any advantage in the production of infor-
mation and liability rules, not surprisingly, start looking better.
One might also think that property rules excessively discourage
takers from investing in information about assets that they might take,
but, as a matter of empirical guesswork, the number of situations in
which the concern for taker investment predominates is likely to be
small.  Not only are owners likely to have had more opportunity to
develop information about assets, the existing owner is likely to be the
easiest person for potential trading partners to reach.217  If in some
context we thought that takers systematically had an advantage in
developing an asset and that transaction costs were so high that the
taker could not purchase the asset in a consensual transaction (or sell
the information to the current owner), then there would be a reason
to worry about property rules protecting an entitlement in existing
owners.218  In such a situation, a liability rule might make sense.  But,
215 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 727.
216 Id. at 775.
217 Buyers have no obligation to disclose their private information about assets to
sellers, and it is highly unlikely that in the general case we would want to move from
property rule to liability rule protection to save the costs of buyer efforts at maintaining
that secrecy.  Secrecy sometimes can be the lowest cost method of ensuring the
appropriability of returns from investments in information.  Trade-secret law requires rea-
sonable efforts at maintaining a secret in order to qualify for legal protection. See infra
note 233 and accompanying text. R
218 This worry has been most prominent in the context of corporate takeovers, but the
concern here is a special one:  Agency costs may be so great that a rule mandating manage-
ment passivity in the face of takeover bids would protect bidders’ investment in informa-
tion about targets that would otherwise be unrecoupable, especially in auctions. See
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\79-5\NYU503.txt unknown Seq: 66  3-NOV-04 14:56
1784 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1719
as I have argued, there is a basic asymmetry between liability rules
and property rules:  The former presuppose that we have selected out
uses to be evaluated (A v. B), but property rules protect a delegation
to the owner to select from (and even to develop) uses, which does
not require courts to make such choices.219
A theory based on information costs can also account for some of
the intuitions about property rules that have come into question in the
recent literature.  Indeed, the traditional intuitions that property rules
afford stability of expectations, permit planning, and allow owners to
invest in assets are incompletely theorized versions of the argument
here.220
These traditional intuitions have been difficult to defend in the
face of the liability rule literature, and property rules have thus
acquired an air of paradox.  But, as with most paradoxes, the problem
lies in the assumptions one is making.  The key to the paradox is the
“modern” assumption that knowledge is static and is either knowledge
of the average, here the average value, of a fixed “class” of assets or
events on the one hand or knowledge of the full particulars of an indi-
vidual asset or event on the other, with nothing in between.  Instead,
knowledge can range from perfect particularized knowledge to no
knowledge; the knowledge of the averages of wider and narrower
classes ranges along this continuum.  As Knight recognized, there is a
continuum from risk to uncertainty.221  Moreover, different actors
have different production functions for producing knowledge and for
creating classes about which actuarial statements can be made, thus
moving from uncertainty toward risk.  For Knight, the entrepreneur
gained profits from her advantage in fulfilling the function of assessing
uncertainty and acting on her judgment.222  By extension, ordinary
people are “entrepreneurs” when it comes to those things that they
RATE LAW 162–211 (1991).  Even here, these concerns must be balanced against invest-
ments in information by current management and owners. See David D. Haddock et al.,
Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 709–17
(1987).  Note that the pro-bidder commentators are not suggesting converting current
shareholders’ property rule protection to liability rule protection, even though current
management’s ability to benefit from the property rule would be curtailed by a manage-
ment-passivity mandate.
219 See supra Part III.A.
220 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 32, at 360–64 (discussing view of Blackstone, Smith, R
and Bentham, and mentioning antecedents in Hobbes and Hume); Rose, supra note 6, at R
2188.
221 KNIGHT, supra note 13, at 199. R
222 For Knight, uncertainty was a necessary condition of the entrepreneur’s profit, and
this takes the form of a residual claim.  The notion of the residual claim has long been
associated with property, and I will show how information cost contributes to an explana-
tion for the tight connection between ownership and residual claimancy. See infra Part
IV.C.
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value most.  The attraction of property rules is that they protect indi-
viduals’ values without their having to be able to justify these values
or even reason about them at a conscious level.  On the information-
cost theory of property rules offered here, property rules tend to be
favored where owners produce information about assets and events
more cost-effectively than takers, and takers produce information
more cost-effectively than do courts or other officials.
C. The Problem of Self-Help
Property rules and delegation to owners of information gathering
under uncertainty also have advantages where owners would be able
to take self-help measures to protect their entitlements.  Much has
been written about the question of why we have property protection
rather than no protection and, in particular, why theft is thought to be
inefficient.223  A theme of this literature is that, without property pro-
tection, those in possession will take self-help measures to prevent the
theft of their assets.  Such efforts are inefficient if they are less cost-
effective than government-supplied protection.  The indirect costs of
theft in terms of self-help measures have to be weighed against the
costs of government-supplied protection and the costs of transactions
that might be needed to move assets to higher-valuing users.224  In
those cases in which present owners place a high value on assets, the
possibility of a higher-valuing non-owner is diminished and the will-
ingness of such an owner to incur the costs of self-help is highest.
This concern about self-help extends to some of the situations in
which the law faces a choice between property rules and liability
rules.225  David Haddock and Fred McChesney argue that conven-
tional liability rules pegged at compensation will invite opportunism:
Potential takers will invest in finding takeable assets and owners will
incur costs to prevent takings.226  In their analysis, the problem is that
liability rules, by being undercompensatory—in that the amount of
compensation they provide is less than the price that the parties would
223 These dynamic costs of theft were first raised by Gordon Tullock in The Welfare
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228–31 (1967).  For more recent
discussion and extensions, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams,
The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 367 (1997), and
Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In:  Economists and Benefits from Crime, 13 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 225 (1993).
224 See Hasen & McAdams, supra note 223, at 376. R
225 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 769 (problem of takings in absence of liability R
and under liability rules is matter of degree).
226 David D. Haddock & Fred S. McChesney, Do Liability Rules Deter Takings?, in THE
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LIABILITY RULES:  IN DEFENSE OF COMMON LAW LIA-
BILITY 29, 38–39 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1991).
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arrive at in a negotiated sale—will invite opportunism, with all its
costs.227  Property rules are better if the sum of extra administrative
costs and opportunism costs under the liability rule exceeds transac-
tion costs (including the foregone benefits of transactions that do not
occur) under the property rule.  If the liability rule does not provide
enough protection for the owner’s asset, then the owner will under-
take self-help, and potential takers will invest in finding takeable
assets and circumventing owners’ self-help protections.  The possi-
bility of such opportunism has a number of troubling consequences,
and I will argue that the concern about opportunism persists even
under the more sophisticated variants of the expected-average-harm
approach of the more recent pro–liability rule literature.228
As we have seen, the liability rule literature gets around the con-
cern with high information cost by claiming that courts or other offi-
cials can use some variant of average or expected harm as the measure
of damages.  If, however, owners know their own values but cannot
communicate them to a court cost-effectively and credibly, then those
owners will be tempted to take measures to make their asset less sus-
ceptible to takings than other assets that appear to be similar to the
court (i.e., that the court will group into the same actuarial class).
Owners will invest in secrecy agreements, extra locks, and the like.
Such actions are potentially wasteful in their own right.
Such self-help also means that the averages that the court calcu-
lates initially will be in need of frequent revision.  If the court treats
the members of a heterogeneous asset class uniformly and some high-
value owners in effect opt out of the system through self-help, then
the average harm that a taker inflicts will change over time.  Takers on
average will now impose less average harm—not counting the indirect
harm of encouraging self-help by some high-value owners.  Courts
might lower their estimate of the average harm—at some additional
administrative cost—but the waste from the self-help remains, and the
court may incur additional costs in updating its estimates.
The analogy of takings under liability rules to theft also allows us
to separate two issues.  In the theft literature, explanations of why
theft is inefficient have centered on two factors:  that thieves on
average value goods less than their existing owners, and that owners
and thieves engage in unproductive rent-seeking type activities in
order to prevent or effect theft, respectively.229  The liability rule liter-
ature can be seen as focusing on the first, or value, question almost
227 Id. at 30, 33–36, 38–39.
228 See supra Part II.B (discussing pro–liability rule literature).
229 Hasen & McAdams, supra note 223, at 367–68. R
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exclusively.  Concerns with allocative efficiency relate to whether an
asset or activity will wind up in the hands of the highest-valuing party.
But as the literature on theft has shown, the dynamic costs of self-help
and efforts to effect nonconsensual transfers also loom large and
probably present a better explanation for the criminal prohibitions on
theft.230  To be sure, whether these dynamic costs are important in any
given situation or type of situation is an empirical matter.  But existing
evidence points to these costs’ importance,231 and the fact that liability
rules are used as sparingly as they are is consistent with the impor-
tance of dynamic rent-seeking costs.
There may be situations in which the owner’s self-help measures
would be the most cost-effective way to protect investments in infor-
mation.  But this will not always, or even often, be the case.  Instead,
the entire property system rests on an assumption that government
enforcement of entitlements is often superior to owner self-help.232
Situations in which the law even requires reasonable care on the part
of owner-victims are rare.  As an unusual example, in trade-secret law,
enforcement of a trade secret requires that the plaintiff have taken
reasonable measures to keep the information secret in the first
place.233  But this is very unusual.  Owners do not need to lock their
230 See supra note 223. R
231 See Hasen & McAdams, supra note 223, at 371–75 (discussing indirect evidence for R
costs of theft).
232 See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE:  ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL
RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE 1–58 (2002); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 29–30 (1975).  And in many
contexts, the law increasingly prohibits owner self-help. See Douglas Ivor Brandon et al.,
Self-Help:  Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American
Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 860–72 (1984) (documenting that legislative and case law
tends towards restrictions on self-help in property area).
233 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178–80 (7th Cir.
1991) (discussing significance of requirement of owner precaution); E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that blocking
aerial photography of factory under construction was not required under reasonable pre-
caution).  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as
information including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that:  (i) derives independent economic value
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reason-
able under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437, 437–38 (1990); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“[A] substantial element of secrecy
must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in
acquiring the information.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f
(1995) (“To qualify as a trade secret, the information must be secret. . . . [T]he requirement
of secrecy is satisfied if it would be difficult or costly for others who could exploit the
information to acquire it without resort to the wrongful conduct proscribed under § 40.”).
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cars in order to sue for conversion or erect fences in order to sue in
trespass.  Ultimately, whether self-help measures are cost-effective is
an empirical question, but the law is consistent with the view that they
usually will not be.  And, intuitively, it would seem that there are sig-
nificant economies of scale in the enforcement of property rights,234
making government provision more attractive.
Moreover, liability rules tend to be used exactly where we think
people will not engage in costly self-help or extensive efforts at posi-
tioning themselves to engage in private takings under the liability rule.
For example, the exception for necessity is so narrow that it is unlikely
that people will do much to anticipate and foreclose the use of a dock
or a mountain cabin by someone in dire need.  Nor will many people
put themselves in mortal peril just to be able to use these resources.
Likewise, in the often-cited example of the mill acts, the provisions for
public oversight (including some kind of a public interest require-
ment) and the requirement to get officials’ permission are likely to
obviate the need for much private self-help on the part of potential
flooders and floodees.235
One form of owner self-help would be to retake the entitlement
from the taker.  Kaplow and Shavell, building on the traditional intui-
tion about the stability afforded by property rights, suggested that this
possibility of serial takings and retakings might be a reason for prop-
erty rules in the case of tangible assets.236  Subsequent commentators
have supported a more sweeping case for liability rules by arguing that
the mere possibility of multiple takings does not imply inefficiency
and multiple takings do not necessarily distinguish between ownership
of tangible assets and other kinds of entitlements.237  But a dynamic
theory of information costs favors the conclusion that is reached by
traditional property theorists and reflected in Kaplow and Shavell’s
intermediate view.  In terms of information costs, efficiency will
depend on how production of information about the asset over the
course of the series of takings compares with the production of infor-
mation by the owner backed up by a property rule and (depending on
the level of transaction costs) supplemented by voluntary transfers of
the entitlement.  It is true that takings and retakings will provide some
information about value to a court, allowing it to refine the class into
234 See, e.g, BARZEL, supra note 232, at 25; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTI- R
TUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 58 (1990); Merrill & Smith, supra note
78, at 51. R
235 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. R
236 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 720, 757. R
237 See supra note 30. R
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which the asset is categorized.  But it is not likely to be a cheap way of
doing so.
Which method of information production is most cost-effective is
an empirical question.  Nevertheless, it is possible to venture some
empirical guesses about the typical case.  If the original owner O
might now retake, the retaking is wasteful if the same result could
have been achieved without this step.  Further, under such a liability-
rule regime, people with a talent at taking will be encouraged to prey
on those with talent at discovering.  And selling the information sepa-
rately may not be feasible because of Arrow’s paradox of information:
Once a potential seller of information reveals information to a poten-
tial buyer, the buyer has the information and has no reason to pay for
it.238  This problem may be overcome in a variety of ways, including
intellectual property rights, but one of the most basic methods of pro-
tection is ownership of an asset that is complementary to the informa-
tion.239  Thus, if a seller has information about the asset and has an
entitlement to the asset backed up by a property rule, then the seller’s
entitlement to (and investment in) the information is automatically
protected along with the asset.240  In fact, for this reason, the crucial
aspect of property rights in land or things is often informational.  A
classic example is the knowledge of whether there are minerals under
the surface of a plot of land.241  The key role played by a trespass in
defining the scope of trade secret protection is another example:  The
238 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 615 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) (“[T]here is a fundamental paradox in
the determination of demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until
he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost.”).
239 David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation:  Implications for Integra-
tion, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL. 285 (1986) (arguing that
firm’s ability to innovate and profit from innovation may depend on ability to control
assets complementary to its inventions).
240 See Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25
RAND J. ECON. 20, 33–35 (1994) (noting that rules requiring disclosure about assets in
transactions have less effect on sellers because they control assets complementary to infor-
mation); see also John Umbeck, Might Makes Rights:  A Theory of the Formation and Ini-
tial Distribution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38, 38–39 (1981) (including within
property rights expectation of value in coconuts on part of only one who can climb tree or
expectation of value in fish on part of one with secret knowledge of their location).
241 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957) (protecting
owners of mineral estate against unauthorized explorers who were authorized by surface
owners to locate their seismographic equipment on parcel surface).  It is an open and
debated question whether one can be liable for exploratory trespass if one has neither
committed a physical trespass nor located the equipment directly above the targeted min-
erals?that is, whether one can trespass if one is exploring from an adjacent tract and one
has permission from those with rights in that tract. See Owen L. Anderson, Geophysical
“Trespass” Revisited, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 162–63 (1999).
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information entitlement is based in part on the enforcement of the
physical boundary, for example around a factory.242
* * *
The pro–liability rule literature makes liability rules look attrac-
tive by focusing on some “transaction costs” while ignoring or dis-
counting others.  The literature to date has taken transaction costs to
be those of bargaining over the entitlement, including those
preventing some wealth-increasing transfers altogether.  These costs
are important, because the costliness of transactions may indeed keep
an asset from its highest use.  The liability rule literature solves this
problem by simulating a contract under which the takee will receive a
proper reward for its contribution to value—as modified by considera-
tions of fairness if these are being considered.243  The natural next
question is why the reward should take the form of an entitlement
backed by a property rule rather than by a liability rule.  But “transac-
tion costs” broadly conceived also include a range of other costs of
property rights and institutions left out in the course of making the
case for liability rules.244  As with all transaction costs, the Coase
Theorem implies that if the cost of producing information were zero,
then choice of liability rule or property rule should not matter; it is
positive transaction costs, here information costs, that cause the law to
matter.245  Once we take account of the costs and benefits of discov-
ering and choosing among uses of an asset and otherwise developing
valuable information about it, property rules can be superior to lia-
bility rules.  Moreover, under reasonable empirical assumptions, the
range of cases in which property rules will be superior is quite large.
This is encouraging from a descriptive point of view, because the law
teems with property rules.
242 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. R
243 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1002–05, 1110, 1114–15 (discussing “other R
justice” reasons for determining entitlements and method of protecting them); see also
Ayres & Goldbart, supra note 5, at 13 (noting how dual-chooser rules allow decoupling of R
allocation and distribution in choice of liability rules).
244 Allen, supra note 113 (distinguishing two definitions of transaction costs—costs of R
trading and costs of establishing property rights or institutions—and arguing for utility of
latter).
245 Coase, supra note 33; Deirdre McCloskey, The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. R
ECON. J. 367 (1998) (pointing out that part of Coase Theorem that originated with Coase is
claim that placement of liability does matter in world of positive transaction costs, not that
placement of liability does not matter in world of zero transaction cost, as conventionally
stated).
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IV
PROPERTY RULES AND THE NATURE OF PROPERTY
In their article, Calabresi and Melamed coined the term “prop-
erty rule” but without relating property rules to the traditional notion
of property.  Instead, following in the Realists’—and Coase’s—foot-
steps, they ignored property as an in rem right to a thing in favor of
“entitlements,” which have no antecedent character until filled in by
judges resolving use conflicts between plaintiffs and defendants.246  In
this Part, I show that the view of property rules afforded by the infor-
mation-cost theory captures the deep connection between “property
rule” treatment and the traditional notion of property as an in rem
right to a thing.
I will show first that the strategy of exclusion is likely both to
contribute to making a right more property-like and to calling for a
property rule treatment.  Put differently, if the character of an entitle-
ment as property is a matter of degree, it will correlate with the
degree to which delineation of the right relies on the exclusion
strategy and its attendant property rule protection.  Second, I will
show that the recently much touted put-style liability rules (in which
an entitlement holder can force its sale on another) raise the very
information-cost concerns that make exclusion and property rules
attractive in the first place.  Finally, I demonstrate that the notion of a
residual claim, so central to property and ownership as well as organi-
zations, rests heavily on the rough and low-cost delineation of outer
“boundaries” in the exclusion strategy, backed up by property rules.
A. Property Rules and Degrees of Property
That exclusion and governance are based on signals (measure-
ment proxies) that differ in their cost structure allows us to reconcile a
major conflict between the bundle-of-rights and the exclusion-based
views of property.  Consider the in rem nature of property rights.
Ever since Wesley Hohfeld’s famous articles, controversy has periodi-
cally erupted over what an in rem right is, and by extension what
“property” means.  Hohfeld sought to clarify the use of the ambiguous
term “in rem” by replacing “in rem right” with “multital rights.”247  A
multital, as opposed to a paucital right, is one that is matched by a
large and indefinite number of similar rights held by the same right-
holder against a variety of duty-holders.  Crucially for Hohfeld, rights
always hold between persons.248  Contract rights would be paucital
246 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 32, at 379–83. R
247 HOHFELD, supra note 49, at 67–78. R
248 Id. at 30–32, 72.
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because they are not so matched but rather stand alone or with only a
few similar rights.  When A owns Blackacre, the right of property is
multital because it holds between A and B, A and C, and between A
and each of a large and indefinite class of other persons.  By contrast,
if A has contracted with B for B to stay off Blackacre, A’s right (and
B’s corresponding duty) are paucital.  As between A and B, the right
in the two cases is the same, except that in the first (multital) case, the
right is one of many similar rights that A holds.  This conception of in
rem and in personam rights has led indirectly to the familiar “bundle
of sticks” view of property.249
Opposed to this atomized view of property is one in which the
right to exclude is taken as fundamental.250  Here, too, the in rem
character of property is key.  Penner, for example, objects to
Hohfeld’s framework because, from the point of view of the
dutyholder, there is no need to identify the owner of Blackacre in
order to know one’s duty.251  This argument reverses and extends one
made by Albert Kocourek shortly after the publication of Hohfeld’s
article.  For Kocourek, an in rem right is “one of which the essential
investitive facts do not serve directly to identify the person who owes
the incident duty.”252  Thus, according to Kocourek, property (along
with other in rem rights) is relatively unspecified along the dimension
of dutyholders.  Both Penner’s and Kocourek’s theories, in turn, have
antecedents in Austin’s view, mentioned earlier, that “indefiniteness”
is the “very essence” of property.253  The idea is that property encom-
passes a sphere of liberty and is good against such a large and indefi-
nite class that it would be futile to spell out the full implications of the
right.  By contrast, many contractual rights are more fully spelled out.
The spelling out of rights is a matter of degree, and as argued above, if
it were not for the cost, any degree of specification would be possible.
It is by taking account of the cost of defining rights through more
or less tailored signals that we can partly reconcile the bundle-of-
rights and exclusion-based views.  For a right against the world—
249 See, e.g., Arthur Linton Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE
L.J. 429, 429 (1922) (“Our concept of property has shifted . . . .  ‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to
describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal rela-
tions?rights, powers, privileges, and immunities.”); Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld,
51 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1938) (interpreting Hohfeldian scheme from legal realist point of
view); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 32, at 364–65. R
250 See, e.g., J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 13 (1996); PENNER, supra note 213, at 71; R
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954); Thomas
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
251 PENNER, supra note 213, at 25–31; Penner, supra note 180, at 724–31. R
252 Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 322, 335 (1920) (emphasis
omitted).
253 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. R
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where rightholder and dutyholder need not know much at all about
each other in order to act in reliance on and in accordance with the
right—exclusion is likely to make sense.254  Because it bundles many
uses together from interference against the world, exclusion is a low-
cost, low-precision method of defining rights.  If property is less speci-
fied along the dimensions of rightholders and permissible uses, then
exclusion is likely to be the predominant element of the method used
to define the right.
Hohfeld and his critics are looking at two aspects of this problem
of delineation.  Hohfeld is considering the extension of the concept of
property; in its implications for the rights and duties of persons, an in
rem property right and a large (and indefinite) series of in personam
contract rights are equivalent.  But for philosophers like Penner, prop-
erty and contract are not the same because they are analyzing its
intension, the concept itself:  How we know whether someone has a
right is different if it is a relatively anonymous property right than if it
is a personalized right under a contract.255  To this we can add that the
contours of these two concepts—property and contract—reflect the
costs of implementing them.  Property is more “exclusion-based” than
other rights because, for a given resource, exclusion uses a low-cost
signal for a bundle of related uses against all those lacking the owner’s
permission.
We can now see in what sense the Coasean approach as devel-
oped in the liability rule literature follows in Hohfeld’s footsteps.
Like Hohfeld and Coase, the liability rule literature frames questions
in terms of the lowest common denominators—the “sticks” in the
bundle—and then proceeds synthetically to ask how bundles should
be built up.  By doing so, however, this type of approach has already
assumed that thinking in terms of individual uses is the correct
approach.  It assumes away the possibility of stepping further back
and defining a set of uses implicitly—without the need for enumera-
tion, let alone evaluation—and using an exclusion strategy to delegate
further choice to owners.  To be sure, in some contexts the law will
have to face directly the first-order problems of governing use, but, in
a large range of situations, the law can avoid this type of determina-
tion.  And for reasons of information costs, it usually makes sense for
the law to proceed this way.
254 See Smith, supra note 24, at S467–74. R
255 See PENNER, supra note 213, at 23–31. R
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B. The Absence of In Rem Puts
Another striking feature of the law is the absence of in rem puts,
in which one has the right but not the obligation to force a sale on
another party.  Recent liability rule literature has entertained the pos-
sibility of increasingly exotic types of liability rules.  In the traditional
liability rule under which a victim “has” the entitlement but is only
protected by the liability rule, the potential taker has a “call” option
on the entitlement; she has the right, but not the obligation, to violate
the entitlement and pay damages (the exercise price for the call
option).  Some authors have asked why liability rules could not take
the form of “put” options.256  A “put” liability rule would give the
pollutee the entitlement (to be free from pollution) but also the
option to force its sale to the polluter.
Property scholars have been skeptical of the value of put-style
liability rules.257  It is unclear to them why giving a choice to the
holder of a put as to who gets the entitlement makes any sense.  To
this we can add that put-liability rules differ from call-liability rules in
that the latter but not the former dovetail with a governance regime.
Exclusion rules are typically directed towards a large and indefinite
audience (in rem) and are correspondingly simple and tend not to
require much specialized background knowledge.  Governance rules
are typically more information intensive; they contain more informa-
tion per unit of delineation cost, and so are especially suited for
smaller, more close-knit, and more expert audiences, such as a limited
group with access to a common pool resource.258  In a grazing com-
mons, the “rest of the world” need only know to keep off, and only
the insiders, the commoners, need know about the regulations of
grazing times and the requirements for tethering animals.  The more
detailed rules may or may not be backed up by liability rules (putting
a value on certain resource-depleting activities), but exclusion rules
directed at the world at large tend to be backed up by property rules,
as in trespass.
One difference between in rem call and put liability rules is in
how the world at large has to process them.  In a call liability regime,
the rest of the world has the power but not the obligation to take
entitlements.  Liability can be avoided categorically, for example, in
the case of auto accidents by not driving.  In the case of put-style lia-
bility rules, the put, if in rem, means that any member of the public
256 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998);
Ayres & Balkin, supra note 30, at 729–33; Morris, supra note 5, at 854–56. R
257 See Epstein, supra note 6, at 2093; see also Rose, supra note 6, at 2180, 2184–88. R
258 See Smith, supra note 140, at 1111, 1116–17, 1150–56. R
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might have to worry about being forced to pay for an entitlement she
has never contemplated before.  The information-gathering costs, or
alternatively, the debilitating uncertainty that this involves, has no
corresponding benefit.  It is true that tort law is not standardized like
property—there is no numerus clausus of torts and courts can devise
new torts in response to new social conditions259—but tort law also
generally avoids casting generalized affirmative duties on the public at
large.  Even in tort law, in rem rights always have as correlatives
duties of abstention.260  A member of the public does not have the
affirmative duty to be a forced buyer of an entitlement.
In the few cases in which the law uses puts, a relationship
between the parties already exists.261  The person who is the forced
buyer has taken some action to be in the special position of the in
personam dutyholder under the liability rule.  Thus, in conversion, the
victim can either recover the thing or force its sale, but it was the
converter who initiated the relationship.  But members of the large
and indefinite general public are spared the information-gathering
costs of being subject to put-style liability rules.
C. Property Rules and Residual Claims
A final notion closely associated with the ownership of property
is the residual claim.  Often the holder of the residual claim is called
the “owner” even if other interests of a more limited nature have been
carved out of the total bundle of rights over the asset.  The owner of
the residual gets that which is left over after all the other claims have
been honored.262  The question is why this is so.
259 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 63–64 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
260 See A.M. Honore´, Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting, 34 TUL. L.
REV. 453, 458–59 (1960); id. at 459 (“[T]here appears to be no instance, either in the
Anglo-American or continental lists, of a right protected by a claim that persons generally
should perform something.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 77, at 788–89; see also R
HOHFELD, supra note 49, at 72; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement R
and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J. 66, 70–71 (1917); Jacob, supra note 150, at 1377–78 R
(“[Hohfeld’s] position on affirmative obligations relates directly to his belief that property
was paradigmatically constructive rather than consensual.  The argument he is making is
that few affirmative, as opposed to negative, obligations ought to be broadcast.  Hohfeld
has in mind something like the obligation to join a posse.”).
261 See Epstein, supra note 6, at 2093–94.  This is a special case of the proposition that R
the law does not impose in rem duties that require affirmative acts. See note 260 and R
accompanying text.
262 For Oliver Hart, the right to control the use of an asset
resides with the owner of the asset.  Ownership of an asset goes together with
the possession of residual rights of control over that asset, that is, the owner
has the right to use the asset any way that is not inconsistent with a prior
contract, a custom, or any law.
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One answer centers on risk bearing.  The holder of the residual
bears all the exogenous risk.  Efficiency suggests that a person who
has an advantage in bearing risk will hold the residual.  One variant of
this is that a person who can affect the mean value of the asset will get
the residual.263  This person has more impact on the value of the asset
and so should get more of the upside and downside of the asset’s
value.  These hypotheses may help answer why the owner owns a lot
of the asset, but they do not wholly explain why the residual is defined
negatively—as that which is left over after other claims have been
carved out.  Why not build the residual synthetically out of smaller
“sticks” in the bundle of rights?
One answer is that the residual claim is a response to information
cost.  In the case of an enterprise, the contribution that is hardest to
measure will have a return based on something more like a residual
claim.264  The virtue of a residual claim is that the person’s contribu-
tion need not be measured directly.  The residual is by definition that
which is left over from an asset after all other claims have been
honored.  Thus, to measure out the residual, one must define the asset
as a whole—which will be necessary for all sorts of purposes—and will
then have to measure the contributions of the other claims.  This is
very different from trying to build up the residual directly by trying to
figure out the value of the residual holder’s claim in terms of its con-
stituent sticks.
Here is where the definition of property as a bundle of rights can
be misleading.  If we think of the rights to an asset as a bundle of
sticks and the residual as the sticks left over after other sticks have
been parceled out, the question becomes why we cannot just figure
out which sticks the “owner” should have directly.  The problem is
that the bundle-of-rights view assumes away delineation and other
information costs.  Before rights are parceled up, they do not come in
predefined sticks.  Some delineation is necessary to have sticks.  Thus,
on this view, it is very different to define the residual claim as what is
left over after other rights have been defined and measured than it is
to define the residual as the resulting “sticks.”  Recall Markby’s
analogy of property to a bucket of water, which is not conceived as an
Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, in ORGANIZATION
THEORY 154, 160 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995); see also, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Fidu-
ciary Duties as Residual Claims:  Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a
Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1279–80 (distinguishing notions
of residual claim as residual cash flow and residual legal rights).
263 YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 (2d ed. 1997).
264 See Yoram Barzel, The Entrepreneur’s Reward for Self-Policing, 25 ECON. INQUIRY
103, 105, 114 (1987).
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aggregate of drops.265  The fact that the owner tends to have an
“indefinite reservoir” of use rights follows from the nature of the
delineation problem.  The owner has this reservoir because the
cheapest way to divide the asset uses the asset’s outside boundary and
the boundaries of the nonresidual claims.  The claim of someone
whose contribution to the value of the asset is significant and difficult
to evaluate will be a good candidate for the residual right because the
savings in delineation costs will be correspondingly high.
V
CONCLUSION
Property rules have informational advantages.  There has been
much talk of delegation and information harnessing among
pro–liability rule commentators, but these approaches all assume that
property operates on a use-by-use basis and that uncertainty is reduc-
ible to risk.  But if property law has to contend with assets that have
multiple, costly to measure attributes, an exclusion-based strategy
becomes a reasonable first pass at internalizing the costs and benefits
of the various uses of an asset.  Delineation under exclusion proceeds
implicitly and not use by use.  Further refinement can occur through
governance rules in those situations where the stakes are high enough
and the group whose behavior is targeted is small and expert enough
that further precision in use control is warranted.  Property employs
the exclusionary regime to delegate to owners the first-order choices
of uses with respect to an asset.  Property rules back up this choice
because courts are usually less efficient at dealing with uncertainty
than are owners and potential takers.  Property rules also typically
allow less self-help and manipulation by owners and takers.  And the
kind and amounts of information required under a property rule com-
plement the information generated under an exclusionary regime.
This information-cost theory of the advantages of property rules
can explain some otherwise very puzzling aspects of the law.  It helps
explain why property rules are so widespread and are used in basic
situations of the sort that refined theories easily overlook.  Basic
regimes like trespass are only exceptionally supplemented in the law
with off-the-rack governance regimes like those in the law of nuisance
and necessity.  For reasons of information cost, precisely those entitle-
ments that tend to be labeled property will be delineated using
methods falling towards the exclusion end of the spectrum and will be
protected through property rules rather than liability rules.  The infor-
mation-cost theory of property rules also allows one to explain why
265 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. R
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property rules are associated with the notion of property through the
use of regimes of exclusion to delineate rights.  The absence of in rem
puts is both related to the exclusionary regime and its accompanying
property rules:  Forcing people at large to be purchasers of entitle-
ments involves high information costs.  Finally, the information-cost
theory also allows a better understanding of the nature of the residual
claim and its central place in the theory of property.  Property rules
are aptly named.
